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The New Geographies of Corporate Law Production  
 
DIONYSIA KATELOUZOU† & PEER ZUMBANSEN‡
 
42 U. Pa. J. Int’l L., Forthcoming (2020) 
 
Abstract 
 This article starts from the understanding of corporate governance as a 
transnational regulatory field of law production, contestation and policy conflict. 
It advances three arguments, a historical one, a sociological one and a legal 
doctrinal/legal theoretical one. Historically, we argue that the evolution of 
corporate governance norms must be seen against the background of ongoing and 
continuing transformations in the relationships between states and markets in 
the provision of a growing range of formerly “public” services and functions. As 
the societal role of corporations expands beyond an essentially financial role, 
corporate governance norm production mirrors the diversification of regulatory 
concerns associated with the firm’s place in society. From a sociological 
perspective, we argue that the transnationalization of present-day corporate 
governance regimes constitutes not so much a categorically different state of 
corporate law in an age of “globalization”, but a continuation of the corporate 
law’s inherent legal pluralism in terms of co-existing public and private, hard 
and soft, formal and informal norms. Finally, our legal doctrinal and legal 
theoretical argument posits that the emerging constellations of corporate 
governance are mirrored in changing understandings of rules applied to 
corporate responsibility, director liability or a company’s reporting standards. 
In order to further explicate the particular dynamics that characterize the 
new geographies of corporate governance norms today, we take the evolving law 
of shareholder stewardship as a case-in-point. Our analysis intervenes at the 
intersection of what is, normatively, a political challenge to the corporate 
governance understanding of the past twenty years – the latter being confined to 
a triple fallacy of a vain competition between shareholder versus stakeholder 
oriented concepts of the firm, a polarization between monolithic national models 
of corporate governance, and a binary distinction between state-
made/hard/binding law and non-state/soft/non-binding law – and, 
institutionally, the dramatic de-nationalization of market regulation through 
governmental fiat. We argue that this plurality of corporate governance political 
economies today can only be scrutinized through a more differentiated, analytical 
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lens which focuses on the emerging actors, norms and processes that constitute 
the intersecting and overlapping transnational regimes of corporate governance 
today. Transnational corporate governance is thereby rendered as a 
methodological laboratory to inquire into emerging forms of authority and 
legitimacy, scrutinizing competing claims of effectiveness and testing the “real 
world” impact that emerging regulatory forms, such as stewardship codes, have 
on a wider set of stakeholders and “affected” populations. In that vein, a critical 
project of transnational corporate governance prompts a reconceptualization of 
the “transnationally embedded” corporation and its key actors as a counter model 
to today’s financialized economic governance framework and has broader 
implications for corporate law production. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate Governance is today a transnational field of regulatory 
norm-production, policy making and political contestation. It is 
constituted by the interplay between both public and private actors, 
which include states, a wide range of global investment funds, 
multinational corporations, unions, corporate and public policy think 
tanks as well as diverse civil society interest groups. Despite long-
standing attestations to the contrary1, its key normative foundations are 
continuously and, recently, with increasing intensity, scrutinized and 
challenged.2 Today, the transnational spaces in which the contestation of 
the publicly held corporation, its role in society, its function and its 
purpose unfolds mirror the border—crossing organizational scope of 
corporations as governance institutions, law makers and wielders of 
enormous power and influence.3 What emerges from an institutional and 
 
1 Dodge v. Ford Motor Company, 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919), 507 
(“There should be no confusion (of which there is evidence) of the duties which Mr. 
Ford conceives that he and the stockholders owe to the general public and the duties 
which in law he and his codirectors owe to protesting, minority stockholders. A 
business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the 
stockholders...”). Milton Friedman, The social responsibility of business is to increase its 
profits, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, 13 September 1970. 
2 Leo E. Strine Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective 
on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L. 
J. 1870 (2017), 1873 (“The republic upon which typical Americans depend is one where 
the debate is between corporate-manager agents and money-manager agents, both of 
whom have different interests than ordinary human investors”). 
3 Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L. L. J. 229 (2015), 231 (“… 
corporations have developed the capacity to negotiate with states to create norms of 
international law—norms that bear a particular kind of relationship of priority to the 
state party’s domestic legal order”). Christopher May, Who’s in charge? Corporations as 
institutions of global governance, 1 PALGRAVE COMM. 1 (2015), 5 (“… corporations 
construct regimes of private law to govern the relations between the various elements, 
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procedural perspective is a continuously evolving assemblage of norms, 
which due to their hybrid nature between obligation and 
recommendation, public order and private standard, sits uncomfortably 
with traditional notions of law as statute, court order or treaty. Today’s 
corporate governance norms display a significantly broad regulatory 
focus, ranging from matters such as board composition in terms of gender 
or race and risk oversight to executive pay, shareholder activism and non-
financial reporting. While this expansion of corporate governance is, at 
least in part, also a response to changing societal attitudes towards 
today’s corporate business enterprise and its enormous socio-economic 
power over its various stakeholders4, the legal nature of “social”, “green” 
or “sustainable” corporate norm-making initiatives is problematic and 
remains under-explored. Seen through a public lawyer’s eyes, almost 
everything about the transnationalization of corporate governance 
appears to raise questions of legitimacy.5 In other words, who, if not a 
democratically elected law-maker, should create norms that potentially 
affect significant parts of society? Which processes are in place today to 
ensure adequate societal input into the design of the norms, their 
enforceability and their amenability to reform or adaptation? What is the 
norm-creating authority of the largely private actors in this field based 
on? 
 
while also seeking to influence public law institutions... The use of private law 
(contract provisions and arbitration agreements) often utilises public international law 
as a background justification but equally is crafted to serve the needs of the particular 
corporate network in which it is deployed…”). David L. Levy & Rami Kaplan, 
Corporate Social Responsibility and Theories of Global Governance: Strategic 
Contestation in Global Issue Arenas, in: OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 432 (A.Crane, D.Matten, A.Williams, J.Moon & D.S.Siegel eds., 2008). 
4 Michael B. Dorff, Why Public Benefit Corporations?, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77 (2017), 78 
(“Of all the social and economic challenges to the current state of Delaware corporate 
law, perhaps the most potentially cataclysmic is the shift in attitudes about the very 
purpose of corporations”). See also Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance: The New 
Paradigm, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 11 January 
2011 (“The effects of short-termism are damaging to the economy as a whole. (…) To 
provide greater macroeconomic and financial stability and to raise productivity, it is 
essential that markets work in the public interest and for the long term rather than 
only on short-term returns”). 
5 Larry Catá Backer, Economic Globalization and the Rise of Efficient Systems of 
Global Private Lawmaking: Wal-Mart as Global Legislator, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1739 
(2007), 1745 (“… as economic activity increasingly crossed borders … public law, as 
either substantive rules or as systems of governance, has proven increasingly unable to 
respond efficiently to the problems of the governance of economic relations”). And id., 
at 1747 (“The ability to disperse ownership and operations across the globe has made it 
possible for the largest multinational corporations to become essentially self-regulating 
… the absence of regulation might itself be inefficient, at least to the extent that it 
enhances unpredictability and arbitrary conduct...”). 
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The following analysis intervenes in this debate on three accounts. 
Our first argument is a historical one, our second a sociological one and 
our third argument is one both of legal doctrine and legal theory. 
Historically, we show how the development of corporate governance 
norms, first domestically and, then, increasingly transnationally, has 
been keeping pace with and must be seen in close connection with 
particular transformations in the distribution between public and private 
actors in carrying out essential social functions (Part II). While these 
traditionally included the provision of investment opportunities for 
private placements and different forms of collaboration between 
corporations and the state on offering old-age security arrangements, 
corporations today have assumed central and controlling roles in the 
delivery of nearly all tele-communication services, vast portions of health 
care, municipal waste disposal and urban development and planning, 
infrastructure financing and even military warfare through extensive 
sub-contracting arrangements. As the range of corporate activities 
continued and continues to expand, so does the scope of what is considered 
to be part of the regulatory – corporate governance – framework that 
companies should comply with. We set out to chart these emerging 
political economies of contemporary corporate law and corporate 
governance against the background of three central (yet increasingly less 
convincing) themes in the continuing scholarly corporate governance 
debate over the past four decades. Historically, we recognize a triple 
fallacy in that regard: first, we take issue with what has turned out to be 
a rather vain and ultimately inconclusive (and, thus, unhelpful) 
competition between shareholder- versus stakeholder-oriented concepts of 
the firm. Secondly, we challenge the polarization that has been the 
central theme to distinguish and off-set against each other allegedly 
monolithic national models of corporate governance. Such polarization, 
we feel, is too often predicated on assumptions of economic efficiency 
which, in turn, results in an overdrawn opposition of two competing 
models of capitalist organization as in the convergence/divergence debate 
of the 1990s and early 2000s. Finally, we argue that the complex political 
economies which make up today’s corporate governance assemblages cast 
the still prevailing idea of distinguishing between state-
made/hard/binding law and non-state/soft/non-binding law in a critical 
light. In short, neither the qualifiers “public” and “private” nor of “hard” 
and “soft” are particularly helpful in mapping what are in reality 
processes of norm formation and dissemination which easily surpass 
state-centered law-making institutions. 
Sociologically, our argument draws attention to the always already 
existing instability and unsettledness of regulatory norms in areas such 
5 
 
as corporate law, securities regulation, labor law or social protection. 
Legal sociologists have long been emphasizing the prevailing legal 
pluralist nature of regulatory governance in fields, where public and 
private, formal and informal, “hard” and “soft” norms not only exist side 
by side, but in fact complement one another by addressing different 
aspects of social or institutional behavior. Today’s diversified and, as 
regards its border-crossing nature, transnational constitution of 
corporate governance norm-production is not an anomaly of law-making, 
but a further step in the evolution of legal norms in politically sensitive 
and continuously changing contexts. By reviewing the development of 
corporate governance regimes as a particular form of regulatory 
governance “in context”, we argue in Part III that the transnational 
constellations of actors, norms and processes which constitute today’s 
corporate governance regulation produce new and overlapping political 
economies. No longer confined to the regulatory prerogative of a domestic 
law maker or regulator but also not (yet) having been reclaimed by an 
international financial regulator with global governance authority, 
corporate governance rules today appear, instead, as being negotiated, 
shaped, disseminated as well as “hardened” through the interplay of 
major market players and supranational institutions, in relation to whom 
states have increasingly assumed the role of mediators or mere 
facilitators. Building on the important political economy work on the 
“varieties of capitalism” (VoC) and the tensions between so-called 
“coordinated” and “liberal” market economies, we argue that today’s 
proliferation of public, private and hybrid processes of corporate 
governance norm production requires a differentiated view on the 
relationship between states and local, regional and global markets. And, 
it is, ultimately, from a pluralized political economy perspective on 
corporate law that we propose a reconceptualization of corporate law and, 
in particular, of corporate governance as a transnational field, which can 
no longer adequately be depicted through the categories which used to 
apply for corporate law as a domestic law and policy concern.  
We argue for a maturation of corporate governance regulation in a 
pluralistic world which is not entirely centered in national political and 
legal orders but emerging out of and reaching beyond them. But at the 
same time national corporate governance regulation is being transformed 
from within by global agendas and goals.6 From this perspective, the 
proposal of an idea of transnational corporate governance aims at opening 
a research agenda for corporate governance scholarship which is based on 
 
6 For an incisive analysis of contemporary global social change, see SASKIA SASSEN, 
TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES (2008). 
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the contextual approach outlined above and which critically challenges a 
pre-dominantly law-and-economics analysis of corporate governance,7 
which posits the inevitable convergence of national laws through a 
process of regulatory competition – while not always exploring more 
deeply the particular political challenges that arise from distinctly 
transnational, hybrid formation processes of corporate governance in 
globalized financial markets, which are driven by the interplay of 
governments, institutional investors, but also unions, labor and 
community as well as environmental activists.  
In contrast to important work, which connects corporate law theory 
with a focus on the respective political economy context,8 a transnational 
legal pluralist approach to corporate governance posits to both build on 
and go beyond the institutional analysis provided by the VoC scholars. In 
that vein, it becomes possible to study the emergence of private and self-
regulatory regimes in corporate governance against the background of the 
state transformation that marks the fate of modern nation states in the 
global era.9 Such an approach can be off-set from the still dominant one, 
according to which the “end of history”10 sees a global convergence of 
shareholder value-oriented norms for corporate governance, while 
differences in regulatory approaches will be traded and settled on a 
“global market for corporate law”.11 A transnational legal pluralist 
approach to corporate governance engages but is not limited to the 
domestic space as an important forum for corporate governance creation. 
It resists drawing categorical lines between the national, the 
supranational and the international spheres of norm creation and instead 
acknowledges the specific processes of norm creation which occur among 
and through public and private actors within as well as across those 
boundaries.12 As such, it resists the normative consequentiality of the 
 
7 See infra Part II. 
8 Mark Roe and his collaborators have undertaken important steps in that direction. 
See e.g. Mark J. Roe & Massimimiliano Vatiero, Corporate Governance and Its 
Political Economy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 
56-83 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018). See already MARK J. ROE, 
POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, POLITICAL CONTEXT, 
CORPORATE IMPACT (2003).  
9 Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Process and State Change, 37 L. & SOC. INQU., 
229-264 (2012). 
10 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 
GEO. L. J. 439 (2001). 
11 ERIN O’HARA & LIBSTEIN E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET (2009). 
12 See in that regard also Julia Black & David Rouch, The development of global 




dominant narrative, which emphasizes the restrained role that 
governments should play in “regulating” corporate behavior per se while 
embracing the idea that restraint will eventually result in a perfect 
regulatory regime for corporations on a global scale. The blind-spot of this 
narrative remains the, actually, much wider political debate about the 
role that corporations play in modern societies, a debate which touches on 
the immense impact of corporations on employment, social security, the 
environment and, increasingly, privacy13, and which oftentimes seems to 
be going on in considerable distance from the specialized corporate law 
circles as such.14 But, not only financialization has transformed the 
corporation and corporate law.15 At a time, where consumption patterns 
have become insulated from climactical or geographical facilities and 
where the global exchange, extraction and sale of data fuels a 365/yr & 
24/7 available, “informed” and willing consumer, corporations hold 
significant power. Meanwhile, the regulatory theories which focus on 
corporations and their internal and external relations, are lagging 
behind.  
From this follows our third argument, which concerns the interplay 
between legal doctrine and legal theory in corporate governance today. In 
light of a legal pluralist understanding of corporate governance norm 
production today, the related institutions of norm production, 
adjudication and enforcement are taking on new forms. Legal 
institutions, like law itself, do not exist in the abstract and ephemeral, 
but in concrete social contexts. It is from them that they receive 
affirmation or rejection, impulses for change or continuity. Legal doctrine, 
in corporate law and beyond, is a child of time, and as such must be 
understood in the context in which it is relied upon. As we show in our 
analysis in Part III, this context for (corporate) law production has been 
undergoing significant changes with privatization and globalization 
 
13 For an excellent and comprehensive analysis of the challenges posed by the digital 
technology and the quest by powerful corporations to predict and control behavioral 
patterns, see SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT 
FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2018). 
14 David Vogel, Political Science and the Study of Corporate Power: A Dissent from the 
New Conventional Wisdom, 17 BRIT. J. POL. SCI., 385 (1987); Barbara Fryzel, 
Governance of Corporate Power Networks, 23 FINANCE & BIEN COMMUN 28-38 (2005); 
Geert de Neve, Power, Inequality, and Corporate Social Responsibility, 54 REV. LAB. , 
63-71 (2009); GEORGE MONBIOT, Taming corporate power: the key political issue or our 
age, THE GUARDIAN, 8 December 2014; Nicholas Connolly, Corporate power and human 
rights, 19 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 663 (2015). 
15 Laura Horn, The financialization of the corporation, in THE CORPORATION. A 
CRITICAL, MULTI-DISCIPLINARY HANDBOOK 281 (G. Baars ed., 2017); Costas Lapavitsas, 
The financialization of capitalism: Profiting without producing, 17 CITY, 792 (2013). 
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driving a fundamental reconfiguration of traditional architectures of 
public law making and administration. As corporate governance codes, 
codes of conduct and other best practice standards become more and more 
woven into the regulatory/self-regulatory fabric of what constitutes 
corporate law around the world today, legal doctrine is fast-learning to 
navigate these new formations. As codes formulate new modes of 
accountability, transparency and compliance, doctrinal assessments of 
corporate and directors’ liability or a company’s and its investors’ 
reporting obligations change.16 These adaptations are neither born out of 
essentialist assertions of legal causality and responsibility nor do they 
neatly adhere to law-and-economics principles underlying the “nature of 
the firm”: instead, the new legal doctrines of corporate governance 
incorporate these continuously evolving standards but evaluate, assess 
and shape them in light of the changing sociological constellations that 
constitute the regulatory universe of corporate governance today. 
In order to further explicate the particular dynamics that 
characterize the transnational emergence of corporate governance norms 
today, we take in Part IV the evolving law of shareholder stewardship as 
a case-in-point. We trace the shareholder stewardship movement from its 
beginnings with the internalized self-regulatory processes which 
translated into the “soft” UK Stewardship Code and other similar codes 
across various countries forward to the time of the amended EU 
Shareholder Rights Directive (SRD II).17 We posit that shareholder 
stewardship, even though it started as a case of enrolling institutional 
shareholders in corporate governance regulation via soft, market-
invoking law based on conventional law-and-economics assumptions, it 
became increasingly hardened and brought a “public” coloration into 
shareholder engagement and investment management integrating 
sustainability concerns. At the same time, the adoption of stewardship 
 
16 Susan N. Gary, Best Interests in the Long Term: Fiduciary Duties and ESG 
Integration, 90 COLO. L. REV. 731 (2019), 734 (“Financial analysts increasingly consider 
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors in rating companies ... The 
complication for a fiduciary is that these factors may also reflect benefits or costs 
beyond a company's financial bottom line”). See already Frederick Alexander, 
Delaware Public Benefit Corporations: Widening the Fiduciary Aperture to Broaden the 
Corporate Mission, 28 J. APPL. CORP. FIN. 66 (2016). Id., The Capital Markets and 




17 Directive 2017/828/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 
amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder 
engagement [2017] OJ L132/1 [hereinafter SRD II]. 
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codes across 19 countries, the SRD II and the development of supporting 
stewardship principles and codes of conduct by regional and international 
investor associations show that the national, regional and international 
“policy space” is currently much more perplexed. Part V concludes by 
reconsidering transnational corporate governance as regulatory 
governance. 
 
II. THE TRANSNATIONALIZATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
1. Unfolding the Emerging Regulatory Geography of Corporate 
Governance 
How does today’s corporate governance landscape and its distinctly 
transnational constitution compare to the prevailing understanding of 
corporate law as a predominantly domestic, only rarely international or 
global concern? While this is hardly the place for a detailed account to the 
origins of the modern corporation and contemporary corporate 
governance,18 there are two stories to follow here, and the distinction 
between them will inform our ensuing analysis.  
Within the discipline, the legal field of corporate law, the theme of 
corporate governance emerged as a field of study in the mid-1970s and it 
was throughout the 20th century that corporate governance scholarship 
and debate have stayed relatively close to the general understanding of 
the corporation as, above all, an investment vehicle: as a result, 
discussions among corporate law scholars and practitioners mainly 
focused on a handful of key themes and issues, including the operation, 
duties and composition of the board of directors,19 as well as on the tension 
 
18 For a historical account of the modern corporation, see, e.g., Ron Harris Law, 
Finance and the First Corporations in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE RULE OF LAW, 
145-171 (Lee Cabatingham, James J. Heckman & Robert L. Nelson eds., 2010); Oscar 
Gelderblom, Abe de Jong and Joost Jonker The Formative Years of the Modern 
Corporation: The Dutch East India Company VOC, 1602-1623 73 J. OF ECON. HISTORY 
1050-1076 (2013); Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan Kleinheisterkamp & Mark D. 
West The Evolution of Corporate Law 23 UNI. OF PENN. J. INT’L ECON. L. 791 (2002). 
19 George W. Dent Jr., The Revolution in Corporate Governance, the Monitoring Board, 
and the Directors’ Duty of Care, 61 BOSTON UNIV. L. REV. 623 (1981); Franklin A. 
Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of Directors, 33 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 89 (2004). 
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between managerial authority and shareholder rights20, on executive 
remuneration and, to some degree, on the differences among national 
systems of corporate governance.21 The focus here was predominantly on 
thefunctional role of corporate law..22 Correspondingly, seeing law’s role 
with regard to the corporation as “enabling”23, rather than as mandatory, 
corporate governance norms were measured primarily with regard to 
their ability to facilitate the attraction of capital.24 Mirroring the rise in 
importance of the idea of shareholder wealth maximization as a firm’s 
definitive performance measure, corporate governance rules have been at 
the center of a continuing debate over how to best organize and run a 
company.  
Meanwhile, there has been, for a long time, a parallel corporate 
governance discourse, which is concerned with the socio-economic context 
of the actual firm. This discourse is grounded in a political economy 
analysis of the historically evolving institutional and normative 
frameworks that constitute the firm’s regulatory environment which is 
seen to go beyond the ‘separation of ownership and control’ focus of 
corporate law. A political economy analysis of corporate governance sees 
corporate law rules in relation to the law governing industrial relations, 
 
20 Stephen Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy in the Convergence Debate, 16 
THE TRANSN’L LAWYER 45 (2002); Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for 
Activist Shareholders, 60 STANFORD L. REV. 1255 (2007-2008). 
21 See the discussion in what has by now become a classic: REINIER KRAAKMAN et al., 
THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW. A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (3rd 
ed., 2017). See already FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991). For the differences between the US and the 
UK, specifically, see CHRISTOPHER BRUNER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-
LAW WORLD: THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER POWER (2013). Also, for a 
recent change of the corporate governance debate in the US, see The Business 
Roundtable, Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation (2019), 
https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/ourcommitment/. Still one of the most 
astute and perceptive comparative accounts is provided by John W. Cioffi, State of the 
Art: A Review Essay on Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and 
Emerging Research, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 501-534 (1998). 
22 KRAAKMAN ET AL, ANATOMY, id.  
23 An insightful discussion is provided by John C. Coffee, The Mandatory/Enabling 
Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV., 1618 
(1989). See also Edwin R. Latty, Why Are Business Corporation Laws Largely 
Enabling, 50 CORNELL L. REV. 599 (1965). 
24 Hansmann and Kraakman, supra note 21. 
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social protection and employment.25 In that light, scholars of history, 
economics, sociology, politics and socio-legal change situate the study of 
corporate governance within the transformation context of public and, 
increasingly, private governance regimes in more and more areas of 
social, political and economic areas life26 The difference in perspective 
between a more conceptual and this contextual approach is crucial, 
especially when we seek to explain the increasing significance of corporate 
governance regulation on a global scale.27 
The global dimension of corporate governance as a contested and 
fast-evolving policy field is reflected in debates over the organization of 
the firm, the rules governing the relationships between shareholders and 
managers, the level of executive pay and of diversity on the board as well 
as the firm’s philanthropic and environmental engagement as they are 
intimately intertwined with the dynamics of global investment.28 Because 
a company’s corporate governance set-up is received as a signal by the 
market for corporate investment and translates into the firm’s traded 
value, there is a constant push and pull between a firm’s efforts to attract 
capital and its ability to prove its compliance with the type of corporate 
governance that markets will reward.  
These dynamics unfold across a turbulent history of scandal, crisis, 
pressure for reform and a wider debate regarding the place and role of the 
 
25 See, e.g., Peter A. Hall & Daniel W. Gingerich, Varieties of Capitalism and 
Institutional Complementarities in the Political Economy: An Empirical Analysis, 30 
BRIT. J. POL. SCIE. 449-482 (2009), and Claire M. O'Brien, Reframing Deliberative 
Cosmopolitanism: Perspectives on Transnationalisation and Post-national Democracy 
from Labor Law, 9 GERMAN L. J., 1007-1042 (2008). 
26 See, e.g., the contributions to J. ROGERS HOLLINGSWORTH & ROBERT BOYER EDS., 
CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM. THE EMBEDDEDNESS OF INSTITUTIONS (1997). And, see 
Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in 
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004), 343-4 (“In all of these 
contexts, government harnesses the power of new technologies, market innovation, and 
civic engagement to enable different stakeholders to contribute to the project of 
governance”). 
27 See, e.g., ALAN DIGNAM & MICHAEL GALANIS, THE GLOBALIZATION OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE (2009). 
28 See Douglas Cumming et al, Law, finance, and the international mobility of corporate 
governance, 48 J. INT’L. BUS. STUD. 123 (2017), 125 (“The financial impact of good 
governance on the firm is unambiguously positive, both in terms of short-term 
efficiency outcomes and longer-term sustain-ability of the business. Perhaps most 
intuitive is that good governance, which minimizes the chance of managerial tunneling 
(...) as the expropriation of corporate assets or profits –leads to an enhanced capability 
of the firm to raise external capital (...) provide important metrics for the robustness of 
governance at the firm level and find that good governance firms have higher firm 
value, profits, and sales growth”). 
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large business firm in society.29 The opening decade of the twenty-first 
century witnessed a series of large-scale corporate scandals, including 
Enron, Royal Ahold, Parmalat, Satyam, Tyco and Worldcom,30 and 
market failures, from the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2000-1 to the 
GFC in 2008/9.31 While these events have been associated, on different 
scales, with poor corporate governance practices or management 
misconduct and have significantly eroded public trust in large 
corporations and business more generally, they have also been formative 
in the creation of the current momentum of public debate about the 
corporation, its purpose and its responsibilities.   
In trying to better understand the direction of contemporary 
corporate governance norm making, whether through the proliferation of 
private ordering processes and the creation of codes32, judicial 
intervention33 or legislative innovation34,  these developments do not 
occur in a vacuum. Instead, one has to consider the changes in the general 
political economy after the height of the redistributive welfare state of the 
1970s, on the one hand, and the transformation that corporate 
law/corporate governance systems have undergone since that time under 
 
29 Dorff, supra note 4; Lipton, supra note 4. 
30 For summaries of the scandals, see Looking back at the rise and fall of Enron 
HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Nov. 28, 2018, available at 
https://www.chron.com/local/history/economy-business/article/The-rise-and-fall-of-
Enron-9712210.php; Gregory Crouch Ahold to Pay $1.1 Billion to Settle Fraud Suits 
N.Y. TIMES, AT 10; How Parmalat Went Sour BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, JAN. 12 
2004, available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2004-01-11/how-parmalat-
went-sour; Vanessa Valkin, Tyco unwilling to certify accounts FIN. TIMES JUL. 24 2002, 
AT 25; The world after WordCom FIN. TIMES Jun. 27, 2002; Geeta Anand, The Satyam 
Scandal WALL ST. J. ASIA, Jan. 8, 2009, At 12. 
31 See, e.g., John C. Coffee What Went Wrong? An Initial Inquiry Into the Causes of the 
2008 Financial Crisis 9 J. OF CORP. LAW STUDIES, 1 (2009).  
32 Jean du Plessis and Chee Keong Low, Corporate Governance Codes under the 
Spotlight in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 3-20 (Jean du 
Plessis and Chee Keong Low eds., 2017); Klaus Gugler et al, Corporate Governance and 
Globalization, 20 OXF. REV. ECON. POL. 129, 149 (2004).  
33 See, e.g., Ebay v. Newmark (Craigslist), 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010); Gordon Smith, 
eBay v  Newmark: A Modern Version of Dodge v. Ford Motor Company, THE 
CONGLOMERATE, 9 September 2010, available at: 
https://www.theconglomerate.org/2010/09/ebay-v-newmark-a-modern-version-of-dodge-
v-ford-motor-company.html. But, see also Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
34 8 XV Del. G.C.L. §§ 361-362, available at: 
https://delcode.delaware.gov/title8/c001/sc15/; Leo E. Strine Jr., Making it Easier for 
Directors to “Do the Right Thing”?, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235 (2014). And, see the 
EUROPEAN UNION DIRECTIVE 2014/95/EU AS REGARDS DISCLOSURE OF NON-FINANCIAL 
AND DIVERSITY INFORMATION BY CERTAIN LARGE UNDERTAKINGS AND GROUPS, available 
at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014L0095.  
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the influence of globalizing capital markets. As the end of “embedded 
liberalism”35 followed on the abdication of the gold standard and the 
powerful take-off of global financial flows, borders between differently 
legitimated regulatory authorities became increasingly blurred. As public 
and private regulators have been developing frameworks to more 
efficiently meet sector-specific demands in a now globally integrated 
marketplace for goods, services, capital, knowledge and data, these today 
raise difficult questions in terms of what they tell us about the 
relationship between   “public authority” and “private power”.36 
Today, twenty years into the twenty-first century, corporate 
scandals, including Olympus, Wells Fargo, Mitsubishi Motors and Sports 
Direct, continue to expose corporate governance gaps in recent reforms 
and business practices,37 for example with regard to executive 
compensation, directors’ independency, institutional investors, disclosure 
or risk management. At the same time, corporate governance debates 
today have widened significantly and are concerned with the corporation 
itself and the recognition of claims for gender equality, environmental 
conservation and climate change mitigation.38 Reflected also in the 
current and deepening crisis of MBA programs today,39 it is this wider 
and more comprehensive engagement with the business corporation and 
 
35 John G. Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded 
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT”L ORG. 379-415 (1982). 
36 Black & Rouch, supra, note 10; For a critique of private ordering in a global context, 
see A. CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY: TRANSNATIONAL 
MERCHANT LAW IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (2003). 
37 See, e.g., “Olympian illogic; Europe and US should heed lessons of Japanese scandal” 
FIN. TIMES (Nov. 8 11), https://www.ft.com/content/a3f20100-0a26-11e1-92b5-
00144feabdc0; Rachel L. Ensign “Wells Fargo Struggles to Regain Footing” WALL STR. 
J. (Apr. 1 2019) J B1; See also John C. Coffee, A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the 
U.S. and Europe Differ 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POLICY 198 (2005). 
38 E.g. Barnali Choudhury & Martin Petrin, Corporate governance that ‘works for 
everyone’: promoting public policies through corporate governance mechanisms 18 J. 
CORP. L. STUD. 381 (2018). See also Lenore Palladino & Kristina Karlsson, Towards 
Accountable Capitalism: Remaking Corporate Law Through Stakeholder Governance, 
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 11 February 2019, 
available at: https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/11/towards-accountable-
capitalism-remaking-corporate-law-through-stakeholder-governance/, (arguing that 
the dominant SHV focused theories “ignore the reality that other groups of 
stakeholders beyond shareholders—employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, and 
taxpayers—have a stake in corporate productivity … Under shareholder primacy, 
these stakeholders have no voice inside an institution”). 
39 “The MBA disrupted. The future of management education” THE ECONOMIST (Octob. 
31 2019). See already Peter Beusch, Towards sustainable capitalism in the 
development of higher education business school curricula and management, 28 INT’L J. 
EDUC. MANAGEMENT 523 (2014).  
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its place in society that shapes much of the debates at the moment, 
whether that concerns the largely untamed “power” of corporations over 
labor, consumers, local communities, the environment or ‘big business’ 
growing influence on social, economic and political processes.40 This 
contextualization of the corporation not just as an investment vehicle but as a 
powerful actor in a socio-economic context in a state of transformation41, allows for 
an appreciation of the company and its laws through a sociological and 
historical lens. What becomes visible under that lens is a non-linear, 
complex trajectory of the business corporation from the time of Lochner42 
and Dodge43 through the period of the ‘affluent society’44 and the ‘new 
property’45 on through the transnationalization of the corporation46 with 
its trials and tribulations47 until the present time.as a central nodal point 
in the acquisition and control of “information”, “data”, and “knowledge”.48  
The emerging, new geographies of corporate governance does not 
only reflect the reconfiguration of the state whose role is today less and 
less that of a central anchor of regulatory authority, but also by the 
proliferation of different forms of regulation. While the early 2000s saw a 
surge in the creation of corporate governance codes and best-practice 
 
40 John Dunbar, The “Citizens United” Decision and Why it Matters, CENTER FOR 
PUBLIC INTEGRITY, May 1, 2018, available at https://publicintegrity.org/federal-
politics/the-citizens-united-decision-and-why-it-matters/ 
41 IAN HARDEN, THE CONTRACTING STATE (1992); Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 
28 FLA. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 155 (2000); Catherine E. Rudder, Private Governance as 
Public Policy: A Paradigmatic Shift, 70 J. POL. 899 (2008). 
42 Lochner v. New York, 45 U.S. 198 (1905). 
43 Supra note 1. 
44 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY (1958). 
45 Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733 (1964) 
46 Detlev F. Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational 
Law, 83 HARV. L. REV. 739 (1970). 
47 John Gerard Ruggie, Multinationals as global institution: Power, authority and 
relative autonomy, 12 REG. & GOV. 317 (2018); Christina Stringer & Snejina 
Michailova, Why modern slavery thrives in multinational corporations’ global value 
chains, 26 MULTINAT’L BUS. REV. 194 (2018); Jennifer Bair & Florence Palpacuer, CSR 
beyond the corporation: contested governance in global value chains, 15 GLOBAL 
NETWORKS, supplemental issue, S1-S9 (2015); Peer Zumbansen, Politicizing the Law of 
Global Value Chain Capitalism, 1 J. POLITICAL ECON., in press. 
48 Jeffrey Ritter and Anna Mayer, Regulating Data as Property: A New Construct for 
Moving Forward, 16 DUKE L. & TECHNOLOGY REV. 220 (2018); Ivan Stepanov, 
Introducing a property right over data in the EU: the data producer’s right – an 
evaluation, 32 INTER’L REV. L., COMPUTERS AND TECHNOLOGY 1 (2018). See also VIKTOR 
MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & THOMAS RAMGE, REINVENTING CAPITALISM IN THE AGE OF BIG 
DATA (2018), 179 (“The system, even if perhaps appearing to promote liberal values, 
would make George Orwell blush and the East German Stasi salivate: seeming 
freedom on the outside but total state control on the inside”). 
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guidelines in countries all around the world, the main drivers for this 
development, arguably, remained the attempt on the part of different 
sovereign states to render their corporate governance regimes more 
amenable and, effectively, more attractive for capital flows and 
investment practices which have become increasingly volatile and 
impatient. In recent years, however, states have come under even greater 
pressure from powerful private actors that administer enormous financial 
funds and have begun to claim a growing stake in setting the regulatory 
parameters for world-wide corporate investment, often in concomitance 
with market-driven regulatory incentives.49 
The new and continuously evolving processes of regulatory 
innovation are generating a diversifying and particular set of norms, 
which go far beyond the governance scope that had still characterized the 
first-generation corporate governance codes.50 There is today no doubt 
that, despite the shareholder value maximization idea’s fast rebound 
after the GFC, the discourse has begun to shift – in a number of 
directions.51 Leaving behind a somewhat stale and never fully satisfactory 
track record of corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives, at least 
since the 1960s, it appears that today CSR is being transformed into a 
more ambitious and, as regards its scope, more comprehensive 
governance idea.52 This new generation of CSR no longer pits 
shareholders against stakeholders as representatives of two neatly 
distinguishable constituent groups of the modern business corporation, 
but is grounded in the societal transformation that companies have been 
involved in the context of the privatization of formerly public functions on 
the level of the nation state and beyond.  
What emerges before our eyes is a both fragmented – in terms of the 
specific regulatory authority of various involved actors – and, at the same 
 
49 See infra Part IV.  
50 See infra Part V. 
51 See also infra Part II.2. 
52 See, e.g., Banu Ozkazanc-Pan, CSR as Gendered Neocoloniality in the Global South, 
160 J. BUS. ETHICS 851-864, 857 (2019) (scrutinizing how “CSR initiatives in the Global 
South focus on “giving” factory workers a particular set of rights that mimic those we 
might see in developed nations in the West, such as safe working conditions”). And, see 
Dirk Matten & Jeremy Moon, The Meaning and Dynamics of Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 45 ACAD. MGT. REV. 7 (2020), 9 (“First, many CSR issues are concerned 
with the wider responsibilities that companies take for some of their potential negative 
impacts in their supply chains and even their value chains (e.g., unsafe working 
conditions, slavery-like terms of employment, pollution, resource depletion). Second, 
many companies are increasingly focused on the impacts of their operations on the 
planet at large (e.g., policies related to climate change, species diversity, natural 
resource depletion …”). 
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time, spatialized – in terms of the global reach of relevant regulatory 
regimes – assemblage of corporate governance architectures. While their 
focus is still on the business corporation and its core concerns as 
investment vehicle, corporate governance norms today take on board a 
diverse and pluralistic set of concerns and interests, which are in turn 
promoted by traditional (state) and non-traditional (private) “law-
making” actors. The proliferation of the latter is grounded in different 
countries’ particular histories of state transformation and privatization, 
on the one hand, while developing in tandem with a global rise of private 
ordering and standard setting, on the other.53. It is this co-existence of 
public and private normative institutional frameworks of contemporary 
corporate governance that gives rise to a transnational multiplication of 
hybrid, public and private, national and international corporate law 
production.54 Given the extensive role that corporations play in the 
context of an almost infinite number of societal affairs and in 
consideration of the variation of specific instruments and institutional 
forms that corporate governance rules take on in different parts of the 
world, we can speak of a plurality of political economies of corporate 
governance today. 
In the context of this newly emerging, transnational geography of 
corporate governance, the traditional corporate governance narratives, 
which have their foundation in a law & economics understanding of the 
corporation,seem to have only limited analytical value. By contrast, while 
the here suggested contextual approach places corporate governance in a 
field of contestation, that arguably extends beyond organizational 
matters related to executive pay or board composition, it also seems the 
only way to effectively address the corporation in its actual operational 
environment. it is in that regard that we argue for a reconceptualization 
of corporate law and corporate governance as a transnational regulatory 
concern which is part of a law & political economy analysis of how 
corporations are regulated as part of a larger critical engagement with 
the relationship between states and markets.55 Corporate governance 
 
53 NILS BRUNSSON ET AL, A WORLD OF STANDARDS (2000); see also TIM BÜTHE AND 
WALTER MATTLI THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF REGULATION IN THE 
WORLD ECONOMY (2013). 
54 See, e.g., Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Andreas Nölke & Henk Overbeek, The 
Transnational Political Economy of Corporate Governance Regulation: A Research 
Outline, VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT AMSTERDAM, WORKING PAPERS POLITICAL SCIENCE NO. 
5/2003, available at: https://research.vu.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/74100928/137F9259-D62F-
46C8-AC0A5F4C6F592E4B.  
55 See YVES TIBERGHIEN, ENTREPRENEURIAL STATES. REFORMING CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN FRANCE, JAPAN, AND KOREA (2007), and the contributions to Edward J. 
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regulation must, in our view, be described as “transnational” because it 
cuts across the boundaries between the domestic and the international, 
the public and the private. Transnational as a category, then, is of lesser 
value in demarcating jurisdictional borders than it is in exposing the 
doctrinal and conceptual premises based on which an issue is associated 
with the domestic or the international arena. By, instead, focusing on the 
transnational landscape of different actors, norms and processes, that 
include but are not limited to states, laws, court decisions and 
parliamentary lawmaking, it becomes possible to understand the 
transnational law of corporate governance as a methodology of (a 
particular area of) law in a global context.56  
In the following section, we set out to chart these emerging political 
economies of contemporary corporate governance against the historical 
background of corporate governance regulation and state transformation 
over the past four decades.  
 
2.  “Scholarly Bind One”: The Vain Competition between 
Shareholder Versus Stakeholder Conceptions of the Corporation 
The emergence of corporate governance as a topic of interest among 
scholars, policymakers and practitioners of corporate law and the political 
economy of the firm coincided with the fading of the “business stateman”57 
and the rising prevalence of what has variously been termed as the 
“contractarian”, “nexus of contracts”, or “private ordering” theory of the 
firm.58 During a period when economic theories prevailed, corporate 
governance was mainly studied through the neoclassical economic lens of 
agency theory.59 For the proponents of agency theory, corporate 
governance mainly deals with the balance of power between “the three 
 
Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS. TOWARD A NEW THEORY 
OF REGULATION (2010). 
56 Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law, Evolving, in EDWARD ELGAR, ELGAR 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, 898-935 (Jan Smits ed. 2d ed. 2012); Peer 
Zumbansen, Transnational Law, With and Beyond Jessup, in THE MANY LIVES OF 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW: CRITICAL ENGAGEMENTS WITH JESSUP’S BOLD PROPOSAL (Peer 
Zumbansen ed., 2020), in press. 
57 A magisterial presentation can be found in ADOLF A. BERLE, THE TWENTIETH-
CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (1954). 
58 Alchian A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz (1972), Production, Information Costs and 
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777; Michael C. Jensen & William H. 
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).  
59 Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of ownership and control, 26 J. L. 
& ECON. 1155 (1983). 
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key players – the executives, the board of directors and the 
shareholders”,60 while the aim of analysis is to reduce the organizational 
costs of running business through corporations,61 and to maximize 
shareholder value on the basis of shareholders’ residual claims on the 
corporation.62 Agency theory, along with other economic theories of the 
firm,63 had far-reaching effects on the study of the internal organization 
and power structure of the corporation, the functioning and 
interrelationships among the allegedly key corporate actors (board of 
directors, shareholders and management) and their relationships with 
other stakeholders, particularly labor and creditors.64 
Looking at the US as an exemplary case, much of the American 
corporate law scholarship in the last 50 years aimed at finding a 
mechanism to minimize the agency costs that arise from the separation 
of ownership and control and bolstered better corporate governance 
through hostile takeovers, independent directors, performance-based 
remuneration, and activist shareholders.65 At the same time, from a 
teleological perspective, three alternative analytic models, that is 
shareholder primacy,66 director primacy,67 and team production68 
prevailed  (and still do, to a large extent) in US scholarship, offering 
 
60 ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINNOW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2001, Preface, xvii. 
For a recent account of corporate governance, see Marianna Pargendler, The Corporate 
Governance Obsession, 42 J. CORP. L. 359 (2016). 
61 E.g. Oliver Williamson , Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L. J. 1197 (1984). 
62 Fama & Jensen, supra note 59, 302. 
63 Transaction cost economics also supported shareholder governance perceiving 
shareholders as the only corporate constituents that cannot protect themselves from 
firm-specific risk. See prominently OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC 
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985). See also Benjamin M. Oviatt, Agency and 
Transaction Cost Perspectives on the Manager-Shareholder Relationship: Incentives for 
Congruent Interests, 13 ACAD. MANAGEMENT REV., 214-225 (1998). 
64 JOHN ROBERTS, THE MODERN FIRM. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN FOR PERFORMANCE AND 
GROWTH (2004), 123ff. 
65 See, e.g., Henry Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. 
ECON., 110 (1965); Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside 
Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863; LUCIEN A. 
BEBCHUK AND JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED 
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (1991). 
66 Lucien A. Bebchuk, The Myth of Shareholder Franchise, 93 VAND. L. REV. (2007) 675. 
67 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW.  L. REV., 547 (2003); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited 
Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601 (2006). 
68 Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 
85 VA. L. REV., 247 (1999). See, however, Martin Gelter, The Dark Side of Shareholder 
Influence, 50 HARV. INT’L L. J. 129 (2009). 
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differing views on what should be seen as the proper purpose of the 
corporation. Both shareholder primacy and director primacy models – 
derived from neoclassical views of the firm – privilege shareholders 
relative to other corporate constituents and are consistent with 
shareholder wealth maximization,69 even though they take contrary 
positions to the retention of the status quo of managerial control in US 
companies and the merits of shareholder governance.70 By contrast, the 
team production theory of Blair and Stout71 insulates directors from 
shareholders’ direct control exposing shareholder primacy as a “myth”.72 
Even though the team production theory seems to align with stakeholder 
theories of corporate governance,73 Blair and Stout focus only on the firm-
specific contributions of numerous constituencies. A “mediating” board, 
meanwhile does not necessarily protect stakeholders,74 as it “remain[s] 
subject to equity market pressures”.75 Critics of shareholder value 
maximization in the US advanced the argument that the firm-specific 
contributions of all corporate constituents should be considered. In the 
same vein, they championed the board’s superior decision-making 
freedom to weigh the various interests in the balance defending (perhaps 
paradoxically for the non-US audience) the status quo of managerial 
control.76 
Economic literature associated the stakeholder perspective with the 
property rights analysis of the firm in asserting that not only 
shareholders, but also other corporate constituents, such as employees, 
 
69 STEPHEN M BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE, 65-72 (2008). 
70 See, e.g., Martin Gelter, Taming or Protecting the Modern Corporation? Shareholder-
Stakeholder Debates in a Comparative Light, 7 NYU J. L. & BUS. 641 (2011). 
71 Blair & Stout, supra note 68. This theory is built on the Rajan and Zingales’ theory 
of firm which is based on the property rights approach. See, further, Raghuram G. 
Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 QUART’Y J. ECON. 387 
(1998). 
72 Lynn Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. 
REV., 1188 (2002). 
73 Blair and Stout, supra note 68, at 281 (arguing that directors are “trustees for the 
corporation itself”).  
74 David Millon, New Game Plan or Business as Usual? A Critique of the Team 
Production Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV., 1001 (2000); George W. Dent, 
Academics in Wonderland: The Team Production and Director Primacy Models of 
Corporate Governance, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1213, 1129-33 (2008). 
75 Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role 
of the Corporate Board, WASH. L. QUART’Y 403, 435 (2001).  
76 See, further, Gelter, supra note 70. 
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can be residual claimants in investing in specific human capital.77 
Alternative arguments in support of stakeholder’s mandate in the firm 
have often been associated with the CSR movement,78 while being mainly 
derived from the stakeholder theory of the corporation. Even though the 
classic stakeholder theory statement can be traced to Dodd’s writings in 
the early 20th century,79 stakeholder theories made their way into 
academic circles (mainly in management literature) after the 1980s,80 
relying on a range of theoretical bases and evidently displaying varying 
definitions of normative and policy purpose.81 Under the stakeholder 
perspective corporations engage with nothing less than a variety of 
different stakeholders including insiders such as shareholders, managers, 
and employees and outsiders such as creditors, suppliers and customers. 
“Progressive” US corporate scholars have advanced a multi-stakeholder 
concept of the corporation under which corporate managers and directors 
can be understood to owe consideration (and perhaps even fiduciary 
duties) to a wider range of corporate constituents than shareholders, 
including obligations to employees, consumers, suppliers, communities, 
and the environment.82 Yet, such a broad stakeholder approach has 
mostly remained on the sidelines and stakeholders mainly refer to non-
shareholder constituencies who bear risk as a result of the firm’s 
activities. At the same time, the predominant academic assumption in the 
US – except for the middle decades of the century (1940s-1970s) where 
managerialism in North America and Europe coincided with public, 
societal interests – remains that corporations as private, economic 
entities should be run for the collective benefit of shareholders.  
Corporate governance in the UK, like the US, has been largely 
occupied by the assumptions of neoclassical economics and the agency 
 
77 See, e.g., Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the theory of the firm, 89 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1757, 1765 (1989); Oliver Hart and John Moore, Property Rights and the 
Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON., 1119 (1990).  
78 The CSR literature is voluminous, but see, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate 
Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization, 35 U C. DAVIS L. REV. 705 
(2002). 
79 E. Merrick Dodd Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees, 45 HARV. L. REV. 
1145 (1932). 
80 The literature is voluminous, but a landmark publication is R. EDWARD FREEMAN, 
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH (1984).   
81 Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: 
Concepts, Evidence and Implications, 20 ACAD. MGT. REV. 65 (1995); a masterful paper 
remains David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, DUKE L. J., 201-262 (1990). 
82 See generally LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL (ED), PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW: NEW 
PERSPECTIVES ON LAW, CULTURE & SOCIETY (1995); KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES (2010). 
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problems between investors and management,83 and has in general 
privileged shareholders among all the corporate constituents. Departures 
from the doctrine of shareholder value can be found in the work of the 
Bullock Committee in the 1980s and, more recently, in reforms 
addressing the directors’ account to wider stakeholders.84 The latter has 
its roots in the statutory reformulation of the common law directors’ 
fiduciary duty to act bona fide for the interest of the company85 into the 
“enlightened shareholder value” (ESV) principle encapsulated in section 
172 of the UK Companies Act 2006.86 Section 172 provides a legislative 
imperative blended with improved information flow and greater 
disclosure that enables directors to consider wider stakeholder interests 
when making decisions.87 The UK stance, therefore, parts course to some 
degree from the counterpart US shareholder-oriented model,88 but section 
172 lacks behind in terms of setting a true stakeholder mandate.89 This 
is despite the recent strengthening of the reporting requirements relating 
 
83 For a comprehensive law and economics analysis of English company law, see BRIAN 
R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY, STRUCTURE AND OPERATION (1997). 
84 BULLOCK COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY AND INDUSTRIAL 
DEMOCRACY (1987); DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS, ENERGY & INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY 
(BEIS), CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM: GREEN PAPER (November 2016), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/584013/c
orporate-governance-reform-green-paper.pdf; DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS, ENERGY & 
INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY (BEIS), CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM: THE GOVERNMENT 
RESPONSE TO THE GREEN PAPER CONSULTATION (August 2017), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/640631/c
orporate-governance-reform-government-response.pdf. 
85 Pervical v Wright, 2 Ch. 421 (1902). 
86 Note that UK policymakers have rejected the pluralist approach, a variant of 
stakeholder theory based on a property analysis of the firm. COMPANY LAW REVIEW 
MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY: DEVELOPING THE FRAMEWORK, 
LONDON, DTI (2000,); COMPANY LAW REVIEW, MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A 
COMPETITIVE ECONOMY: FINAL REPORT para 3.16 (2001); WALKER REVIEW, Annex 3 at 
137.  
87 For recent empirical evidence on the effectiveness of strategic reporting in the UK 
see Irene-Marie Esser, Iain MacNeil and Katarzyna Chalaczkiewicz-Ladna, Engaging 
Stakeholders in Corporate Decision-Making through Strategic Reporting: An Empirical 
Study of FTSE 100 Companies, 29 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 729 (2018). 
88 For a distinction between the two see CHRISTOPHER BRUNER, CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD: THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
SHAREHOLDER POWER (2013). 
89 On the effectiveness of the ESV see, e.g., Sarah Kiarie, At Crossroads: Shareholder 
Value, Stakeholder Value and Enlightened Shareholder Value: Which Road Should the 
United Kingdom Take?, 17 INTERNATIONAL COMP. & COMM. L. REV., 329 (2006); 
Georgina Tsagas, Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006: Desperate Times Call for Soft 
Law Measures, in SHAPING THE CORPORATE LANDSCAPE (Nina Böger & Charlotte 
Villiers eds., 2017). 
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to section 172,90 which aim to assist non-shareholder groups in holding 
company directors to account as part of a broader framework to enable 
more effective board engagement with the workforce and wider 
stakeholders in order to gain a better and more grounded understanding 
of their views.91 Neither, however, fundamentally changed the UK 
corporate governance system due to the lack of consensus regarding the 
desirability of employee participation on company boards.92 As one of us 
has argued elsewhere,93 the recent reforms cannot alone strengthen the 
way in which the interests of employees, customers and wider 
stakeholders are considered at board level. This is partly because 
increasing the stakeholder orientation of UK companies will require a 
more fundamental “cultural” change, and partly, because UK corporate 
governance still mainly relies on the combination of transparency, 
disclosure and market participants’ actions to remedy undesirable 
outcomes. Qualifying such reform as impossible, given the supposedly 
overwhelming requirement of a wholesale transformation of the 
prevailing “culture”, echoes much else of the corporate governance debate 
of the late 1990s, which was steeped in seemingly uncompromising 
positions of ideological opposition.94 But, time moves on, and the 
circumstances of the opposition of the “convergence” and “divergence” 
camps change. While it is too early to provide any reasonable assessment 
of what a post-Brexit UK culture of corporate governance could look like,95 
the example of Hong Kong’s surprising tenacity in opposing a centralist 
 
90 See Provision 5 of the UK Corporate Governance Code 2018 and section 414CZA of 
the Companies Act 2006, respectively.  
91  This link between ESV and board composition is manifested in Provision 5 of 
the UK Corporate Governance Code 2018 itself, which combines the reporting 
requirements relating to section 172 with three alternative mechanisms to 
engage with the workforce, that is a director appointed from the workforce, a 
formal workforce advisory panel or a designated non-executive director.  
92 For more on this long-standing debate, see, e.g., Andrew Gamble & Gavin Kelly, 
Shareholder Value and the Stakeholder Debate in the UK, 9 CORP. GOV. 110 (2001). 
93 Dionysia Katelouzou, Aditi Gupta & Gerhard Schnyder, More Teeth Needed for 
Corporate Governance Reforms: Response to the Dept. BEIS Green Paper on Corporate 
Governance Reform (2017), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2921800. 
94 Compare Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 10, and Simon Deakin, The Coming 
Transformation of Shareholder Value, 13 CORP. GOV. 11 (2005). 
95 John Armour, Holger Fleischer, Vanessa Knapp & Martin Winner, Brexit and 
Corporate Citizenship, 18 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV., 225 (2017). See also PETER SWABEY, 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE BREXIT EFFECT, ICSA THE GOVERNANCE INSTITUTE, no 




Chinese government in the drawn-out summer of 2019 might serve as a 
reminder of how cultures can change and adapt.96 
In addition, what requires our attention, is that despite the 
predominantly shareholder-oriented perspective of corporations and 
business performance, the UK debate has often arrived at different 
conclusions in relation to the corporation’s obligations and duties to 
society, which are explained by the fact that UK company law, unlike the 
US one, is conceptually built on shareholder governance,97 and UK 
shareholders – particular institutional investors that have dominated UK 
public equity since the 1990s – have been portrayed as “stewards”98 of the 
companies in which they invest. Yet, what the UK example shows is that 
scholarly arguments in support of a broader stakeholder mandate were 
deeply influenced by economic theories. The dissenting pluralist approach 
in the UK,99 similar to the team production theory in the US, supports the 
allocation of governance rights to all the corporate constituents that bear 
firm-specific risk and is, therefore, normatively different from the more 
“societal” stakeholder theories of company law as these developed in 
Continental Europe and Japan in the 20th century.  
In Germany and France, for instance, institutional theories of 
corporate law had a great appeal for most of the 20th century as they were 
seen as a tool to protect the firm and all of its stakeholders against 
controlling shareholders’ opportunism, an issue that was of little 
significance in countries with dispersed ownership structures such as the 
US and the UK.100 However, institutionalism with its accompanying 
 
96 Jean-Philippe Béja, Is Hong Kong Developing a Democratic Political Culture?, 2 
CHIN. PERSP. 4-12 (2007); Francis F. Lee & Joseph M. Chan, Making Sense of 
Participation: The Political Culture of Pro-democracy Demonstrators in Hong Kong, 
193 CHIN. QUART”Y 84 (2008);  Chuanli Xia & Fei Shen, Political Participation in Hong 
Kong: The Roles of News Media and Online Alternative Media, 12 INT”L J. COMM. 1569 
(2018); Peter Pomarantsev, The Counteroffensive Against Conspiracy Theories Has 
Begun, THE ATLANTIC, 7 August 2019, available at 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/08/evolution-protests-
conspiracy-theories-disinformation/595639/.  
97 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW 
WORLD: THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER POWER 29-36 (2013).  
98 See infra Part IV. 
99 See further JOHN PARKINSON, CORPORATE POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY (1993); Gavin 
Kelly & John E. Parkinson, The Conceptual Foundations of the Company: A Pluralist 
Approach, 2 COMP., FIN. & INSOL. L. REV. 174 (1998). 
100 For a good overview of the influence of the theory of the German corporation as 
“enterprise in itself” (Unternehmen an sich) and the French doctrine of the “interest of 
the association of the corporation” (intérêt social or intérêt de la société) to the 
stakeholder orientation of Germany and France, respectively, see Gelter (2011), supra 
note 70, 678 et seq. 
24 
 
stakeholderism seems to have been losing some of its once important 
status as German corporate governance gradually shifted in the 1990s 
away from state control and further towards capital markets.101 One 
explanatory factor for this could be the internationalization of the debate 
in the wake of the ECJ case law following the Centros case, the rise of 
regulatory competition and other forces of international convergence.102 
Japan’s corporate governance system, on the other hand, displayed 
a high degree of “institutional isomorphism”, particularly from the 1960s 
to 1990s, with a strong emphasis on maintaining firm-specific capabilities 
generated by the investment of stakeholders, such as employees.103 
Despite the substantial changes in corporate governance practices and 
the related reforms in the past 30 years that aimed to help Japanese firms 
to adapt their stakeholder model of corporate governance to market 
pressures, such reforms mainly serve a symbolic function and they do not 
cut deep. As a result, a complete shift to a shareholder-oriented model of 
corporate governance is unlikely to take place in Japan.104  
Having already pointed to some of the limitations of insisting on the 
“comparative advantages” of different national corporate governance 
systems without taking into account also the consequences of a 
financialization and hybridization of transnational corporate law norm 
creation, the just offered glimpses into the cases of German and Japanese 
corporate governance suggest that, in effect, context matters. As such, it 
is important to keep at least some cautious distance to an overly self-
fulfilling law-and-economics argument whereby the rise of shareholder 
value maximization is not only inevitable, but also comprehensive and 
without alternatives. Scrutinizing the tunnel vision of the dominant, 
shareholder value-oriented understanding of corporate governance, Lynn 
Stout found, for instance, that such thinking “drives directors and 
 
101 Gregory Jackson, Continuity and Change in Corporate Governance: Comparing 
Germany and Japan, 13 CORP. GOV. 351 (2005); Gregory Jackson, Stakeholders under 
Pressure, 13 CORP. GOV. 419 (2013); see also PHILIP KLAGES, THE CONTRACTUAL TURN: 
HOW LEGAL ACADEMICS SHAPED CORPORATE LAW REFORMS IN GERMANY (2008) 
available at https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/The-Contractual-Turn-%3A-How-
Legal-Academics-Shaped-Klages/36c0182a983dbbc638bff07847ea807abc85ac9b. 
102 See infra Part II.4. 
103 For a detailed account of the traditional Japanese corporate governance system, see 
e.g. Gregory Jackson and Hideaki Miyajima, Introduction: The Diversity and Change of 
Corporate Governance in Japan, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN: INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE AND ORGANIZATIONAL DIVERSITY (Masahiko Aoki, Gregory Jackson & Hideaki 
Miyajima eds. 2007). 
104 See, e.g., SANFORD M. JACOBY, THE EMBEDDED CORPORATION: CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES (2007). 
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executives to run public firms like BP with a relentless focus on raising 
stock price …”105  
More recent literature, especially in the context of transnational 
human rights litigation against MNCs and with regard to corporations as 
part of global value chains, underscores the importance of local context 
and emphasizes the need to closely scrutinize the relations between 
corporations and local communities.106 This orientation casts a new light, 
on the one hand, on who must be considered as a “stakeholder” and as 
being affected by the corporation and, on the other, which wider societal 
and environmental interests may be considered to be in the scope of a 
corporation’s “sphere of influence”, a term which, since the failure of the 
UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and 
other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, was widely 
perceived as needing further specification and contributed to the mandate 
for John G. Ruggie as the then newly appointed U.N. Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General for Business and Human 
Rights.107 What both VoC and post-VoC critiques of corporate governance 
developments show is a much more differentiated and layered landscape 
of norm production, which cannot adequately be depicted on the basis of 
uni-directional normative assessments.108 The same criticism applies to 
 
105 LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH. HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST 
HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012), 3. 
106 POOJA PARMA, INDIGENEITY AND LEGAL PLURALISM IN INDIA: CLAIMS, HISTORIES, 
MEANINGS (2015), Christiana Ochoa, Generating Conflict: Gold, Water and Vulnerable 
Communities in the Colombian Highlands, in NATURAL RESOURCES AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW PERSPECTIVES (Celine Tan & Julio 
Faundez eds. 2017). Lauren Coyle, Tender Is the Mine: Law, Shadow Rule, and the 
Public Gaze in Ghana, in CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY? HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE 
NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY (Charlotte Walker-Said and John Kelly eds. 2015). 
107 A helpful, critical discussion is provided by Denis G. Arnold, Transnational 
Corporations and the Duty to Respect Basic Human Rights, 20 BUS. ETHICS QUARTERLY 
371-399 (2010). And, see John G. Ruggie, The Social Construction of the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights, Corporate Responsibility Initiative, 
Harvard Kennedy School, Working Paper 67/2017, 11 (“The mandate was modest: to 
identify and clarify standards and best practices in the area of business and human 
rights, for both states and business enterprises; to clarify such concepts as “corporate 
complicity” in human rights abuses committed by a related party, as well as “corporate 
sphere of influence…”). 
108 Ruth V. Aguilera & Cynthia A. Williams, “Law and Finance”: Inaccurate, 
Incomplete, and Important, B.Y.U. L. REV., 1413-1434 (2009); See also Ronald Gilson, 
From Corporate Law to Corporate Governance, in HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND 
GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey Gordon and Gordon Ringe eds., 2018), at 18 (arguing that such 
“one-factor corporate governance models are too simple to explain the real-world 
dynamics we observe”). 
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the comparative corporate governance literature which, as we will show 
below, evolved around the adaptation of purportedly global standards. 
 
3. “Scholarly Bind Two”: Convergence versus Divergence and 
Harmonization versus Regulatory Competition 
Comparative work in corporate governance has been largely shaped by 
the shareholder value oriented agenda.109 Despite a widely shared 
appreciation of corporate law being both an ingredient as well as product 
of a national legal culture, the last twenty years at least have seen an 
enormous boost of the idea of there being an overarching set of principles 
in corporate law which contribute to what many scholars have been 
describing as a global convergence of corporate governance principles. The 
law-an-economics narrative has been crucial here as it has been 
emphasizing agency costs as a core problem being faced across different 
corporate governance systems.110 In the background of this debate lies the 
older and more fundamental distinction of corporate governance systems 
along the degree to which they may be categorized as being either 
“outsider/arm’s length” or “insider/control oriented” systems.111 The 
received wisdom is that the former – characterized by publicly held 
companies with diffuse share ownership structures – exists in the UK and 
the US, while the latter – characterized by fewer publicly traded 
companies per capita and more ownership concentration – predominates 
in different forms in Continental Europe and Pacific Asia. Under agency 
theory the primary principal-agent conflict unfolds in a different manner 
across the two corporate governance systems.112 The conflict between 
shareholders and the board of directors is predominant in outsider 
 
109 See, e.g., Donald C. Clarke, “Nothing but Wind?” The Past and Future of 
Comparative Corporate Governance, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 75-110 (2011). For an 
insightful discussion of the different institutional environments that shape the 
shareholder value norm, see John Armour, Simon Deakin & Suzanne J. Konzelmann, 
Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance, 41 BRITISH J. 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 531-555 (2003), and Margaret M. Blair, Shareholder Value, 
Corporate Governance, and Corporate Performance. A Post-Enron Reassessment of the 
Conventional Wisdom, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CAPITAL FLOWS IN A GLOBAL 
ECONOMY (Peter K. Cornelius & Bruce Kogut eds., 2003), 53-82. 
110 See, e.g., Klaus J. Hopt, Hideki Kanda, Mark J. Roe, Eddy Wymeersch & Stephan 
Prigge (eds.), COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE – THE STATE OF THE ART AND 
EMERGING RESEARCH (1998).  
111 Marco Becht and Colin Mayer, Introduction, in THE CONTROL OF CORPORATE 
EUROPE 1 (Fabrizo Barca and Marco Becht eds., 2001), 1. 
112 See, e.g., Lucas Enriques and Paolo Volpin, Corporate Governance Reforms in 
Continental Europe, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 117 (2007), 122-125. 
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systems, while in insider systems the dominant agency problem is 
generated by the conflict between minority and majority shareholders. 
Despite the agency problem being different, comparative corporate 
governance literature, especially in the late 1990s, focused on the core 
agency problem between management and shareholders even in countries 
with prevailing blockholders, such as Germany.113 This is even though a 
separation of ownership and control is the exception worldwide rather 
than the rule.114 More recently, the now eleven authors of The Anatomy 
of Corporate Law argue that one of the functions of corporate law 
(irrespective of the laws of specific jurisdictions) is to minimize 
coordination costs and agency problems among corporate constituents, 
including those between managers and shareholders, minority and 
majority shareholders, and other stakeholders, and they emphasize on 
the “functional” 115 commonality of legal responses to these problems 
across different jurisdictions.116  
As already alluded to, the law-and-economics approach to 
comparative corporate governance and the associated advancement of the 
social norm of shareholder primacy117 was famously epitomized by 
Hansmann and Kraakman in their highly influential article, “The End of 
History for Corporate Law”. Published just at the turn of the 21st century, 
the two leading corporate law scholars proclaimed the dominance of the 
economic-oriented analysis of corporate law and corporate governance, 
and the convergence towards what they describe as the “Anglo-American 
 
113 See, e.g., Stephan Prigge, A Survey of German Corporate Governance, in 
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE – THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING 
RESEARCH 943-1044 (Klaus J. Hopt, Hideki Kanda, Mark J. Roe, Eddy Wymeersch and 
Stephan Prigge eds, 1998). 
114 Rafael L. La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, Corporate 
Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999). 
115 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (3d ed 1998), 
39-40; R Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 339 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann 
eds, 2006). 
116 REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL, THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND 
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, 2-3 (3d ed 2017). This latest edition focuses on seven countries, 
namely Brazil, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US. 
117 For a distinction between the social norm of shareholder primacy and the legal 
requirement of shareholder value maximization in the UK and other jurisdictions, see 
Beate Sjåfjell et al, Shareholder Primacy: The Main Barrier to Sustainable Companies, 
in COMPANY LAW AND SUSTAINABILITY: LEGAL BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES 79 (Beate 
Sjåfjell & Benjamin J. Richardson eds, 2015). 
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shareholder-oriented model” of corporate governance.118 Hansmann and 
Kraakman emphasized economic (efficient) market considerations based 
on an accelerated competition among firms over “best practices” triggered 
by globalization forces,119 and referred to both functional and formal 
convergence with the latter following rather than leading the former.120 
The convergence thesis met with immediate attention and led to a 
voluminous literature of attack and reply. An early criticism came from 
Branson who argued that the “The End of History for Corporate Law” 
consists of “bald assertions” and that any convergence in corporate 
governance is more likely to be regional rather than global.121 In a similar 
vein, Milhaupt argued – on the basis of a property rights analysis – that 
any convergence of national corporate governance systems will be “slow, 
sporadic and uncertain”.122 Also, Bratton and McCahery recognized the 
possibility of an “improved variety of governance systems” or a “set of 
viable distinctive governance systems” rather than a complete 
convergence,123 while, more recently, Gevurtz has contended that 
corporate convergence through imitation and transplant is occurring but 
in an incomplete and impermanent rather than linear fashion.124 On the 
other side of the spectrum, Hansmann and Kraakman defended the 
convergence thesis in subsequent writings even after the Enron scandal 
 
118 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 10, 439 (“There is no longer any serious 
competitor to the view that corporate law should principally strive to increase long-
term shareholder value”).  
119 On the impact of globalization on comparative corporate governance, see Arthur R. 
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WISCONSIN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 477 (2005). 
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122 Curtis J. Milhaupt, Property Rights in Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1145 (1998). 
123 William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance 
and Barriers to Global Cross Reference, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES: 
CONVERGENCE AND DIVERSITY, 23 (Joseph A. McCahery, Piet Moerland, Theo 
Raaijimakers and Luc Renneboog eds., 2002), 30. 
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Never-Ending Story?, 86 WASH. L. REV. 475 (2011). 
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and the GFC,125 while additional support to the convergence thesis came 
from the law and finance literature and the influential “legal origin 
matters” thesis.126 Yet, subsequent “leximetric” research has challenged 
the claim that there has been a significant Americanization of other 
countries’ laws and shows that despite global trends law makers are able 
to deviate from influential models in corporate law and corporate 
governance.127  
Similarly, and as we have already discussed in the context of 
showcasing the contribution made by the VoC school to the corporate 
governance debate, a number of prominent political theories of 
comparative corporate governance challenged the main assumptions of 
the convergence argument. Most prominently, Bebchuk and Roe posited 
that the social forces and structures that shape legal rules, including 
history, politics, and ownership structures, are path dependent and will 
constrain the globalized forces pushing for corporate governance 
convergence.128 Extending this line of thought, Schmidt and Spindler 
added to the analytical mix of path dependence the concept of 
complementarity which relates to the internal “fit” of the institutional 
components of a governance system.129 Because of the complementarity 
found in both insider and outsider corporate governance systems, 
Schmidt and Spindler rule out a rapid convergence towards a universally 
best corporate governance system.130 
While Schmidt and Spindler analyzed the aspect of complementarity 
within a (national) corporate governance system, VoC scholars such as 
Peter Hall and David Soskice have elaborated path-dependent, 
institutional complementarities between different sub-systems of a 
 
125 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward a Single Model of Corporate Law?, 
in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERSITY  (Joseph A. 
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country’s or a region’s political economy.131 By distinguishing, as we 
saw,132  the political economies of developed Western countries as between 
Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) and Coordinated Market Economies 
(CMEs), they were able to paint an arguably more differentiated picture 
of what actually marked up the landscape of corporate governance and its 
attending trials and tribulations. Importantly, they inquired how firms 
coordinate their activities in five sub-systems of the political economy, 
including industrial relations, vocational training and education, 
corporate governance, inter-firm relationships and employees and, based 
on their findings, argued that the level of coordination between the 
different sub-systems would make national corporate governance systems 
(especially CMEs) resilient to convergence.133 Even though the VoC 
approach has been criticized on various grounds, including for 
concentrating too much on firms while paying less attention to other 
actors such as the state,134 for focusing only on Western, developed 
countries,135 for lumping together common law countries,136 and for 
disregarding the tension between path dependency and the need for a 
particular variety (or sub-variety) of capitalism to adapt to changes in 
markets and products,137 VoC had a profound impact on the larger 
debates around the then still very undecided fate of national political 
economies under the threat of what Joseph Stiglitz famously called “The 
Roaring Nineties”.138 With a focus on institutional diversity, the VoC 
scholars explicitly addressed the embedded, historically-grown socio-
political and cultural national corporate governance systems and thus 
underlined the relevance of competitive advantages of national 
 
131 An important, earlier contribution to this field was J. Rogers Hollingsworth and 
Robert Boyer, Coordination of Economic Actors and Social Systems of Production, in 
CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM: THE EMBEDDEDNESS OF INSTITUTIONS 1 (J. Rogers 
Hollingsworth & Robert Boyer eds., 1997). 
132 See supra Part II.1. 
133 Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, in 
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE 
ADVANTAGE 1 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001).  
134 On the central role that the state still plays in political economies such as France, 
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capitalism, 23 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 526-554. 
135 But see, more recently, Andreas Nölke & Simone Claar, Varieties of capitalism in 
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differences. Based on these comprehensive findings, which themselves 
were the result of extensive empirical and quantitative work, they argued 
against a one-way convergence towards the Anglo-American market-
oriented corporate governance system.  
While the convergence/divergence conundrum clearly left its mark 
on the scholarly and policy debates in the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
being furthermore associated with efforts to “export” Anglo-American 
corporate governance principles internationally, a slightly different 
debate began to unfold on the European front, which would soon dominate 
scholarly discussions for years to come. Just as “quite” in the US means 
something else than “quite” in the UK, federalism, harmonization and 
regulatory competition meant very different things in the US and the 
European Union. From an early point onwards, the varied history of 
European corporate law exposed the challenges of harmonization,139 
given the extensive differences in locally rooted and historically grown 
and consolidated company law systems across Europe.140 In comparison, 
this constellation looked very different from the history and experience of 
US-style regulatory competition.141 While the polarities between the US 
pattern of competitive federalism and the different conflict of laws 
regimes of the EU Member States had occupied scholars for a long time, 
the debate over the exportability of the US-style regulatory competition 
took a different turn in light of the European Court of Justice’s case law 
on the free movement of companies. Following the Centros line of cases 
around the turn of the 21st century, the introduction of a Delaware-type 
form of inter-jurisdictional competition among EU Member States’ 
company laws metamorphosed into a pressing actuality, with severe 
repercussions on EU Member States’ diversity.142 As a result, European 
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corporate law and European corporate governance tended to be squeezed 
into a uncomfortable either-or position with choices between 
harmonization and regulatory competition and between shareholder 
primacy and stakeholder theories, largely reflecting the tension between 
the market integration project, on the one hand, and the ambition of 
(certain) Member States to boost national champions, on the other.143  
 
3.  “Scholarly Bind Three”: Private Ordering and the Binary Distinction 
between “Hard” and “Soft” Law 
There can be no doubt that, along with its impact on national, 
international and comparative debates about the purpose of the 
corporation and corporate governance reforms, the law-and-economics 
approach to corporate governance provided strong support for the 
argument regarding the superiority of private and decentralized methods 
of internal governance at the micro (individual firm) level over public 
policy. One of the principal normative achievements of the “private 
ordering” or “contractarian” theory of the firm is the treatment of 
corporate law and corporate governance regulation as contractually 
determinable and market facilitative private law, rather than public 
regulatory law.144 The explicitly anti-regulatory bias fit the time and had 
not much trouble prevailing in policy and scholarly circles, as corporate 
governance regulation displayed an increasing reliance on market-based, 
privately created best practice norms, codes, standards and 
recommendations. The proliferation of national as well as company-
specific corporate governance codes,145 codes of conduct,146 statements of 
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143  For an insightful, retrospective assessment, see Stefano Lombardo, Regulatory 
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Centros?, 452/2019 ECGI WORKING PAPER (May 2019), online 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3392502. with regard to the 
“Volkswagen” landmark decision by the European Court of Justice, see Peer 
Zumbansen & Daniel Saam, The ECJ, Volkswagen and European Corporate Law: 
Reshaping the European Varieties of Capitalism, 8 GER. L. J. 1027  (2007). 
144 For a famous and biting critique, see William W. Bratton, The “Nexus of Contracts” 
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“good” or “recommended” practices by international organizations,147 and 
more recently stewardship codes for institutional investors148 testify to 
the growing consensus around a more indirect approach to “regulating” 
corporate actors by enabling, encouraging and nudging them to use their 
internal structures and processes, particularly the board of directors and, 
more recently, the shareholders to formulate self-regulatory regimes 
rather than turning to “the state” to issue strong commands.  
Where did it start? Arguably, the UK Cadbury Report149 is seen as 
an important milestone in the more recent history of corporate 
governance regulation. Shortly after being issued, the Cadbury Report 
resonated around the world, triggering a true surge of comparable 
“regulatory” initiatives.150 Corporate governance codes have developed 
out of the interactions of governmental or quasi-governmental entities, 
stock exchanges, the business, academic and industry communities, and 
investor-related groups as a response to corporate catastrophes,151 and 
have proliferated across more than sixty countries recommending 
detailed governance frameworks mostly for publicly listed companies.152 
Even though they vary considerably in terms of content, legal status and 
origin, a distinctive feature of these codes is their extensive resort to 
(perceivably, at least) non-statist, non-binding “soft-law” techniques, 
which  provide flexibility and responsiveness to individual, firm-level 
circumstances while keeping regulating detail to a minimum. This 
feature is prominently manifested in the UK Corporate Governance Code 
2018 (and its previous versions) the enforcement of which rests on the 
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investor-driven practice of “comply-or-explain”.153 The “comply or explain” 
enforcement mode, in turn, rests upon two pillars: a sufficiently high-
quality disclosure by companies and an informed evaluation of the 
perceived compliance or non-compliance by the companies’ shareholders 
(especially institutional ones) and the market. “Comply or explain” is, 
therefore, an “obligation” to shareholders (not regulators) to make an 
informed evaluation as to whether non-compliance is justified given the 
company’s particular circumstances and then to take action in cases of 
non-conformance or poor explanations. While much ink has been spilled 
on the effectiveness of the comply-or-explain system with many good 
arguments on both sides,154 what is less explored is the degree of 
coerciveness of this investor-determinable norm production and 
enforcement, which is generally assumed to be entirely voluntary.  
Prior literature notably speaks in binary (either soft or hard law) 
terms and mostly associates “soft law” with informal, non-binding norms 
generated through non-statist processes.155 The lack of any state 
involvement in the initiation and/or monitoring and enforcement is for 
most seen as critical to soft norms, and has sometimes raised concerns 
about the legitimacy of non-state-made, soft law.156 Others emphasize on 
the nature of legal norms and equate soft law with voluntary, non-binding 
rules.157 This presumable lack of express legalization of soft law (namely 
its alleged lack of enforceability) has been the key dimension between the 
early corporate governance codes and best practices, on the one hand, and 
traditional company law, one the other, with the latter being highly 
regulatory in nature, containing many mandatory rules.158 This binary 
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distinction between hard and soft law has been also contextualized 
against the background of a fundamental transformation of the 
regulatory state in the name of decentralization, privatization, and 
marketization, leading to institutional and normative pluralism.159 
We argue that soft legal norms, in the sense that they do not 
emanate from traditional authoritative sources, have nevertheless 
become an important regulatory tool in corporate governance regulation 
with far-reaching and often more coercive implications than traditional 
regulatory theories suggest. Soft corporate governance norms do not lack 
force and effect and they cannot be flouted without consequences.160 For 
example, a common misapprehension regarding the UK Corporate 
Governance Code is that it is an example of “private” law making or self-
regulation. What needs to be recognized, however, is that while the code 
is promulgated and administered by the Financial Reporting Council 
which itself has no statutory footing (at least for now),161 it is still 
dependent on the regulatory state, insofar as it is expressly sanctioned by 
the government, through the UK’s Listing Authority, the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA).162 Therefore, despite the apparent 
voluntariness of the Code’s provisions and the market-dependency of its 
enforcement, the FCA’s delegated statutory powers to enforce the comply-
or-explain obligation have a significant coercive element.163 This 
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approach to corporate governance regulation is, therefore, incorrectly 
described as private or self-regulation, and can be more appropriately 
regarded as “associationism”, “co-regulation” or as a form of “regulated 
autonomy” which is exercised by the market but is supported by state-
ordered regulation.164 The tendency of most of the previous corporate 
governance literature165 to overlook these implications reflects an 
incomplete understanding of soft law – both its impact on individual 
companies and stakeholders at the micro (individual firm) level and on 
financial markets at the macro level – and of the unique institutional 
ecosystem in which it operates and fails to capture the full range of 
options that lie between the polar extremes of state-made/binding norms 
and non-state-made/non-binding ones.166 
 
III. THE POST-GFC “NEW NORMAL”: THE CONSOLIDATION OF HYBRID 
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
Up until this point, we have seen how the central debates of shareholder 
primacy versus stakeholder welfare, convergence versus divergence, 
harmonization versus regulatory competition and soft- versus hard-law 
manifest the survival struggle of national corporate governance systems 
to adapt to purportedly global standards of shareholder-driven 
governance practices. But in the post-GFC world the acontextual and 
universal superiority of shareholder primacy is less easily accepted by 
scholars and practitioners alike.167 While the “normative” embers of both 
the shareholder primacy norm and the stakeholder theory still smolder 
today, one of the key aspects of corporate governance regulation of the 21st 
century is the increasing emphasis on the what might (again) be called 
the “public” dimension of the corporation and of the law relating to it in 
the unfolding political economies of regulatory corporate governance.168 
The current demands for a reconceptualization of the corporation and of 
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corporate law have come a long way from the CSR stand-offs in the early 
1930s but also since the convergence/divergence discussion in the 1990s 
and early 2000s.  
Today, what was previously thought as an exclusively shareholder-
driven regulatory area, is being reshaped by a comprehensive and far-
reaching critique of what the corporation is, does and for whom. The 
historical and socio-cultural embeddedness of long developed national 
corporate governance systems is beginning to make inroads into the 
debate over the alleged “convergence” of corporate governance standards 
around the world or the prospects of continuing “divergencies”. This 
notably invokes consideration of Polanyi’s powerful argument about the 
“double movement” of market economy, in which the laissez-faire 
movement expands the scope of the self-regulating market, and society 
reacts against this subordination to (re)-embed market forces in social 
institutions.169 But despite mounting evidence that the corporate 
governance terrain continues to expand in a significant manner in terms 
of its substantive scope and its geographical relevance, there remain 
considerable misconceptions and communication gaps between the 
conventional debate, as it were, and the increasingly diversified camp of 
critics. For instance, while the VoC approach and its refinements changed 
the normative overtone of these debates, it is our view that its dominant 
focus on national institutional structures is ill-suited to address the 
challenges posed by the significant transformation of corporate law-
making in the 21st century, including the substantial privatization of 
norm-making in corporate law and corporate governance in recent years 
and the influence of international actors, such as the OECD, the World 
Bank, the United Nations, but also private actors and wider civil society 
in corporate governance law-making. At the same time, while not always 
related to corporate governance rules as such, the intensifying public 
awareness of Western multinationals’ connections with egregious labor 
and human rights violations in their supply chains has been an important 
factor in driving regulatory and adjudicatory initiatives in recent years.170 
An important dimension of this development is the high degree of 
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interpenetration between hard and soft, domestic and international 
norms in this context.171  
While there is no doubt that the privatization of norm-making in the 
field of corporate governance is currently deepening and will continue, it 
is important to recognize how public actors continue to both intervene and 
steer but also to engage with private actors in carving out a redefined role 
in facilitating new relationships between corporate actors and labor 
groups and consumers.172 In addition, while corporate law scholars began 
recognizing the growing prominence of soft law in corporate governance 
regulation (especially with regard to corporate governance codes and 
codes of conduct), only rarely was the step taken to actively embrace soft 
law as a new mechanism of regulation.173 In age of an increasing reliance 
on public monitoring and “governance through disclosure” and 
transparency, it comes as little surprise, that soft law norms aiming at 
companies’ self-imposed (or, mandated) obligations to disclose their 
activities, earnings as well as their labor practices down to their 
subsidiaries and contractors figure prominently.174 The expansion of soft 
law into more and more areas of corporate conduct requires a more 
skeptical stance towards the alleged option of choosing between hard and 
soft law. As John Ruggie, then Special Rapporteur of the U.N. Special 
Secretary on Business and Human Rights and responsible author of the 
Guiding Principles, published in 2011, observed: “…in light of the 
multinationals power, authority, and relative autonomy, the time-worn 
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mandatory/voluntary dichotomy inhibits rather than advances our 
coming to grips with the challenges posed by corporate globalization.”175 
In effect, today’s regulatory toolbox of corporate governance is not 
necessarily limited between hard and soft law choices as such. Instead, 
we need to see corporate governance norm creation against the 
background which we sketched at the start of our study: rather than 
testifying to a wholesale “retreat” or even “end” of the state, contemporary 
governance dynamics unfold in a transnational realm in which states, 
private actors, civil society groups, and a myriad of interest groups are 
competing with one another for knowledge, participation and, certainly, 
power. As a result, traditional national, comparative or international 
approaches no longer offer the necessary analytical and conceptual tools 
to map the complex regulatory landscape which has been forming before 
our eyes. This landscape is marked by a proliferation of more and more 
hybrid norm-making in the context of highly specialized, sector-specific 
and yet functionally structured, spatial, de-territorialized regimes which 
are not confined to national or regional boundaries. Nation states no 
longer have – if they ever did – a monopoly on regulating the way 
companies, both MNCs and domestic alike, are controlled and held 
accountable, while the shift from state-centered government to an 
increasingly fragmented system of self-steering by public and private 
actors continues.176  
Still, while the binary categorization of norms as hard or soft 
remains relevant in distinguishing between different enforcement 
mechanisms and with regard to the legitimacy basis that is being claimed 
for a particular norm,177 it is less effective as regards the actual 
performative role played by these norms and the actors engaged in their 
production.178 Corporate governance ‘regulation’ today encompasses both 
a host of institutional/normative and symbolic dimensions. As such, the 
“spaces”179 of corporate governance have different material qualities: 
while they are shaping and are being shaped by various public and private 
actors in the actual creation of new and innovative processes of norm-
generation, these spaces are also epistemic realms which consist of  self-
referential discursive processes and logics. An adequate analysis of these 
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materialities must draw on insights by governance and regime scholars 
who emphasize not only that hard and soft law are best seen as choices 
along a continuum180 and emphasize that soft law can no more remain 
confined to rules of conduct which are believed to have no legally binding 
force.181 In addition, we must acknowledge the power which is 
concentrated in and perpetuated by – dominant – discursive regimes, 
which, as we saw in the example of the law & economics narrative of 
corporate governance, effectively create a justification framework seen as 
value neutral and objective. As has been shown again and again182, the 
so-called ‘end of history’ and its related allegation of a global triumph of 
shareholder value maximization ‘works’ because its narrow premises are 
hidden from view. 
Meanwhile, beyond the scholarly debate around corporate law and 
corporate governance, a broader, rich and growing literature aims at 
addressing the increasingly profuse normative and regulatory mosaic 
that forms against the background of the state’s changing regulatory 
role,183 and prompts the reconceptualization of law and regulation 
through notions of transnational law,184 global law185 and legal 
pluralism.186 Irrespective of the terminological debate,187 legal, social and 
political thinkers have been mobilizing a rich array of approaches to 
address the changing face of legal (private and public) regulation in 
globally integrated markets. Arguably, corporate governance regulation 
has been a latecomer to this dynamic scholarly discussion of the dynamic 
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nature of private regulation which has mainly focused on other non-public 
law fields, including consumer protection, labor regulation, finance, 
banking, human rights, environmental regulation, accounting standards, 
and e-commerce.188 
The here made suggestion of thinking of corporate governance as a 
transnational regulatory field and of approaching it from a legal pluralist 
perspective189 builds on the insights of VoC and comparative political 
economy scholars but reads them against the background of a longer-
standing critique of the all-too-often assumed exclusionary status of law 
as originating in and from the state. In contrast, when we study corporate 
governance through the lens of transnational legal methodology and legal 
pluralism with a focus on the actual actors, norms and processes that 
make up the field, the intricate relations between formal and informal, 
“public” and “private”, hard and soft law norms which make up the 
multiple and spatialized political economies of corporate governance 
regulation today become visible.190 The transnational dimension of public 
and private actors, the newly emerging legal and social forms of norms 
and the multi-level rule-setting processes radicalize the “semi-
autonomous” nature191 of transnational corporate governance regulation 
and reveal the tension between binding state-law, on the one hand, and 
market-based, but still not necessarily non-binding “law”, on the other.192  
It is against this background that the outdated scholarly depictions 
of the traditional corporate governance debates of the past decades unfold 
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and need to be read with considerable skepticism. In response, we suggest 
revitalizing the idea of the ‘embeddedness’ of corporations within the 
social and political system, albeit under present-day conditions.193 In that 
regard, we have to acknowledge the challenges that arise for a project 
which seeks to track and trace the corporation in a complex, historical, 
cultural, political and legal context. This inevitably leads into difficult 
questions of sociology in a context that Luhmann and others194 have 
called the “world society” – which is both multi-level and trans-
territorialized and whose defining feature is the radical fragmentation of 
systems across different governing rationalities.195 While being grounded 
in parts of the VoC story of corporate law and corporate governance, the 
analysis of the “transnationally embedded firm” can be presented as a 
counter model to the largely financialized firm, insofar the latter is too 
often rendered as completely detached from the physical, geographical 
and, well, legal environment in which we see it operating.196 Taking this 
analytical lens is even more important in light of the rise and ensuing 
transformation of the post-regulatory state since the 1980s and the rise 
of the surveillance society in recent times.197 It is with these constellations 
in mind, that we hope to make sense of the particular modalities of today’s 
law-making capacities of the “state” and the “market” against the 
background of intertwining domestic and transnational, public and 
 
193 See Sabine Frerichs, Transnational Law and Economic Sociology, in: OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW (Peer Zumbansen ed., 2020, forthcoming). See 
already Sabine Frerichs, Re-embedding Neo-Liberal Constitutionalism: A Polanyian 
Case for the Economic Sociology of Law, in KARL POLANYI: GLOBALISATION AND THE 
POTENTIAL OF LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL MARKETS 65 (Christian Joerges & Josef Falke 
eds., 2011). See, of course, KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL 
AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (2nd ed, 2001); Robert Boyer & J. Rogers 
Hollingsworth, From National Embeddedness to Spatial and Institutional Nestedness, 
in CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM: THE EMBEDDEDNESS OF INSTITUTIONS 433 (Robert 
Boyer & J. Rogers Hollingworth eds., 1997). 
194 Niklas Luhmann, The World Society as a Social System, 8 INT”L J. GEN. SYST. 131 
(1982); John W. Meyer et al, World Society and the Nation-State, 103 AM. J. SOCIOL. 
144 (1997); CALLIESS & ZUMBANSEN, supra note 140.   
195 Peer Zumbansen, The Next “Great Transformation”? The Double Movement in 
Transnational Corporate Governance and Capital Markets Regulation, in KARL POLANYI: 
GLOBALISATION AND THE POTENTIAL OF LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL MARKETS 181 (Christian 
Joerges & Josef Falke eds., 2011) at 6. 
196 On the embeddedness of corporations and corporate governance systems see 
SANFORD M. JACOBY, THE EMBEDDED CORPORATION: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES (2007); and the 
contributions to THE EMBEDDED FIRM: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, LABOR AND FINANCE 
CAPITALISM (Cynthia Williams & Peer Zumbansen eds., 2011). 
197 See, e.g., ZUBOFF, supra note 13. 
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private, state and non-state law-making processes.198 We do not suggest, 
however, that, as is the much-used cliché before and after neoliberalism, 
“the market” steps into the role of the most influential actor to diminish 
if not to displace the state. Instead, our suggestion is to take into 
consideration the complex interplay between a corporation’s locally 
embedded stakeholders, including respective host governments, on the 
one hand, and an immensely diversified as well as spatially diffused, 
transnational set of claimants of rights towards and in the corporation, 
on the other. From that perspective, the corporation is no longer a token 
in a relatively clean-cut ideological struggle between “state” and “market” 
à la Hayek, Friedman or Zuckerberg, but rather a crucial organizational 
platform and policy arena which is rife with regulatory potential and 
vivacity – from inside and beyond. 
 
IV. THE EMERGING LEGAL DOCTRINE AND LEGAL THEORY OF 
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: SHAREHOLDER STEWARDSHIP 
AS CASE IN POINT 
As is often said, verba docent, exempla trahunt. As such, we shall now 
turn to our case study. The recent regulatory initiative around the concept 
of shareholder stewardship, which we will now focus on, is illustrative of 
the fundamentally transnational nature of the normative evolution of 
corporate governance today. The meteoric growth in the presence of 
institutional investors, such as pension funds, open-end mutual funds, 
index funds and hedge funds, in global equity markets in the last three 
decades, and the changing corporate governance practices (ranging from 
informal forms of shareholder engagement to more aggressive forms of 
hedge fund activism)199 prompted the resurrection of the old corporate 
governance scholarly dogma of “shareholders as monitors”.200 Inspired by 
 
198 On the much larger debate today over how to negotiate the relationship between 
state power and market power, between democratic governance and economic activity 
see Wolfgang Merkel, Is capitalism compatible with democracy?, 8 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
VERGLEICHENDE POLITIKWISSENSCHAFT 109-128 (2014); DANI RODRIK, THE 
GLOBALIZATION PARADOX. DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 
(2011).  
199 See, e.g., Dionysia Katelouzou, Myths and Realities of Hedge Fund Activism: Some 
Empirical Evidence, 7 VA. BUS. & L. REV. 459 (2013). For a recent account of 
shareholder activism, see Assaf Hamdani & Sharon Hannes, The Future of 
Shareholder Activism, 99 B.U. L. REV. 971 (2019). 
200 For an analysis of the changed nature of shareholders in recent decades, see  
Dionysia Katelouzou Reflections on the Nature of the Public Corporation in an Era of 
Shareholder Activism and Stewardship in UNDERSTANDING THE COMPANY: CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND THEORY, 117-144 (Barnali Choudhury and Martin Petrin, eds. 2018). 
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law-and-economic theories, scholars put forward the idea that 
institutional shareholders, especially pension funds, have the skills and 
incentives to engage in efforts to influence or discipline managerial 
activity.201 Post-GFC, however, such benign assumptions with regards to 
an effective monitoring function attributed to institutional shareholders 
have not always fared perfectly well. While some were concerned with the 
purported ability of institutional investors, especially hedge funds, to 
influence companies at their own benefit,202 others have been pressing the 
need to address investors’ short-termism and myopia as well as the 
challenges posed by the increasing equity intermediation.203 This 
transformed the prevailing narrative relating to the corporate governance 
role of institutional shareholders, and currently it is widely accepted, 
especially in policy circles, that institutional shareholders’ engagement is 
a desirable corporate governance attribute only when it ensures long-
term returns for both beneficiaries (investment management) and 
shareholders (corporate governance) and advances social 
responsibility.204  
It is within this ideological and institutional framework that post-
GFC corporate governance reforms aiming at encouraging institutional 
shareholders to actively engage with their investee companies while 
promoting long-term corporate performance and become active 
“stewards” have emerged. Firstly inaugurated by Sir Walker in his 2009 
review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial 
institutions,205 and manifested in the UK Stewardship Code, (UK Code 
 
201 See, e.g., Bernard Black, Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as 
Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277-1368 (1991); John C. Coffee Jr., Liquidity 
Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277-
1368 (1991); Gilson and Kraakman, supra note 65.  Note, however, that team production 
theorists and those who view directors as stewards do not see the role of shareholder 
monitoring as being essential to the health of a company’s corporate governance. See, 
e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 68; James H. Davis, F. David Schoorman & Lex 
Donaldson, Toward a stewardship theory of management, 22 ACAD. MGT. REV. 20 (1997). 
202 Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. 
L. REV. 1255 (2008). 
203 See, e.g., Alan Dignam, The Future of Shareholder Democracy in the Shadow of the 
Financial Crisis, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 639-94 (2013). But see Joseph McCahery, 
Zacharias Sautner and Laura T. Starks, Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance 
Preferences of Institutional Investors, 71 J. FIN.2905, 2915 (2016) for recent findings 
supporting the view that shareholder activism is not driven by short-term myopic 
investors.     
204 See, e.g., Iris H-Y Chiu, Turning Institutional Investors into “Stewards”: Exploring 
the Meaning and Objectives of “Stewardship”, CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 1 (2013). 
205 DAVID WALKER, A REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN UK BANKS AND OTHER 
FINANCIAL INDUSTRY ENTITIES: FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS (2009), available at 
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hereinafter) introduced in 2010 and revised in 2012 and 2019,206 
shareholder stewardship refers to constructive shareholder engagement 
and monitoring of companies on the part of asset managers and asset 
owners for the long-term interests of their beneficiaries, their investee 
companies and the society as a whole. This idea that institutional 
investors should behave as long-term oriented “stewards” has caught on 
globally. Ten years after the launch of the landmark UK Code 
stewardship codes can be found in a number of other countries in Europe, 
i.e. Denmark,207 Italy,208 the Netherlands,209 Norway210 and 
Switzerland,211 and as a basis for the amended EU Shareholder Rights 




206 FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL THE UK STEWARDSHIP CODE (2012), available at 
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/e2db042e-120b-4e4e-bdc7-d540923533a6/UK-
Stewardship-Code-September-2012.aspx. For the 2020 version, see  
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/5aae591d-d9d3-4cf4-814a-
d14e156a1d87/Stewardship-Code_Final2.pdf. 




208 ASSOGESTIONI, ITALIAN STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES FOR THE EXERCISE OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE AND VOTING RIGHTS IN LISTED COMPANIES (2016), available at 
https://www.assogestioni.it/sites/default/files/docs/principi_ita_stewardship072019.pdf. 
209 EUMEDION, DUTCH STEWARDSHIP CODE (2018), available at 
https://www.eumedion.nl/nl/public/kennisbank/best-practices/2017-09-
consultatiedocument-stewardship-code.pdf. 
210 THE NORWEGIAN FUND AND ASSET MANAGER ASSOCIATION (VFF), THE PRINCIPLES OF 
THE INDUSTRY RECOMMENDATION ON EXERCISE OF OWNERSHIP (Verdipapirfondenes 
forening, Bransjeanbefaling for medlemmene i Verdipapirfondenes forening: Utøvelse 
av eierskap) (2020), available at https://vff.no/assets/Bransjeanbefaling-
ut%C3%B8velse-av-eierskap-januar-2020.pdf (only in Norwegian). 
211 GUIDELINES FOR INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS GOVERNING THE EXERCISING OF 
PARTICIPATION RIGHTS IN PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANIES, available at 
https://swissinvestorscode.ch/?lang=en. 
212 SRD II, supra note 17. 
213 In Australia two different industry bodies have issued two stewardship codes, one 
for asset managers and another for asset owners. See, respectively, THE FINANCIAL 
SERVICES COUNCIL (FSC), FSC STANDARD 23: PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL GOVERNANCE 
AND ASSET STEWARDSHIP (2013), available at https://www.fsc.org.au/web-page-
resources/fsc-standards/1522-23s-internal-governance-and-asset-stewardship, and The 
AUSTRALIAN COUNCIL OF SUPERANNUATION INVESTORS (ASCI), THE AUSTRALIAN ASSET 
OWNER STEWARDSHIP CODE (2018), available at https://www.acsi.org.au/publications-
1/australian-asset-owner-stewarship-code.html. 




Canada,215 Japan,216 Hong Kong,217 India,218 Kenya,219 Korea,220 
Malaysia,221 Singapore,222 South Africa,223 Thailand,224 Taiwan,225 and 
 
215 CANADIAN COALITION FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES, 
STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES (2017) available at https://www.ccgg.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/Stewardship-Principles-2019-update.pdf. 
216 THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS CONCERNING THE JAPANESE VERSION OF THE STEWARDSHIP 
CODE, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS “JAPAN’S STEWARDSHIP 
CODE” (2017), available at http://www.fsa.go.jp/news/25/singi/20140227-2/05.pdf. 
217 SECURITIES AND FUTURES COMMISSION, PRINCIPLES OF RESPONSIBLE OWNERSHIP 
(2016), available at 
http://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/files/ER/PDF/Principles%20of%20Responsible%20Ownershi
p_Eng.pdf. 
218 In India, three stewardship codes with different scope have been introduced. See 
INSURANCE REGULATORY AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY OF INDIA, GUIDELINES ON 
STEWARDSHIP CODE FOR INSURERS IN INDIA, IRDA/F&A/GDL/CMP/059/03/2017 (22 
March 2017); PENSION FUND REGULATORY AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (PRDA), 
COMMON STEWARDSHIP CODE, PFRDA/2018/01/PF/01 (4 May 2018); SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA (SEBI) , STEWARDSHIP CODE FOR ALL MUTUAL FUNDS AND 
ALL CATEGORIES OF AIFS, IN RELATION TO THEIR INVESTMENT IN LISTED EQUITIES, 
CIR/CFD/CMD1/168/2019 (24 December 2019). 
219 CAPITAL MARKETS AUTHORITY, THE STEWARDSHIP CODE FOR INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTORS (2017), available at 
https://www.cma.or.ke/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=category&id=92&
Itemid=285. 
220 KOREA STEWARDSHIP CODE COUNCIL, KOREA STEWARDSHIP CODE: PRINCIPLES ON THE 
STEWARDSHIP RESPONSIBILITIES OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (2016), available at 
http://sc.cgs.or.kr/eng/main/main.jsp. 
221 MINORITY SHAREHOLDER WATCHDOG GROUP & SECURITIES COMMISSION MALAYSIA, 
MALAYSIAN CODE FOR INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (2014), available at 
https://www.sc.com.my/api/documentms/download.ashx?id=9f4e32d3-cb97-4ff5-852a-
6cb168a9f936. 
222 STEWARDSHIP ASIA, SINGAPORE STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE 
INVESTORS (2016), available at 
http://www.stewardshipasia.com.sg/sites/default/files/Section%202%20-
%20SSP%20(Full%20Document).pdf. In October 2018 Stewardship Asia introduced the 
first-of-its-kind stewardship code for family owners. See STEWARDSHIP ASIA, 
STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES FOR FAMILY BUSINESSES, available at 
https://www.stewardshipasia.com.sg/sites/default/files/SSP-brochure-
0913_approved%20for%20printing.pdf. For an in-depth analysis of the complexities of 
Singapore-style stewardship, see Dan W Puchniak & Samantha Tang, Singapore’s 
Puzzling Embrace of Shareholder Stewardship: A Successful Secret, _ Vand. J. Trans’l 
L. _ (2020 Forthcoming).  
223 INSTITUTE OF DIRECTORS SOUTHERN AFRICA, THE CODE FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTING 
IN SOUTH AFRICA (CRISA) (2011), available at 
https://www.iodsa.co.za/page/CRISACode. 
224 THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, INVESTMENT GOVERNANCE CODE FOR 




the US,226 and advocated globally by the International Corporate 
Governance Network (ICGN),227 and other regional investor associations, 
such as the European Fund Asset Management Association.228 This 
gradual internationalization, and at the same time fragmentation, of 
shareholder stewardship as a body of soft law for institutional investors 
has led to a substantial but still far from comprehensive body of literature 
in recent years, focusing primarily on the effectiveness of the inaugural 
UK Code and its exportability to other jurisdictions.229 Here, we examine 
the development of the law of shareholder stewardship under the lens of 
transnational regulatory governance, focusing on four key issues that are 
critical for norm-creation, i.e. functions, authorship, nature and 
enforcement. 
In general, stewardship codes are relatively short collections of 
principles and best practices that are accompanied by recommendations 
and suggestions directed to institutional investors (mainly asset owners 
and asset managers) and by extension to service providers, or in some 
cases the law-maker,230 concerning the corporate governance role of 
investment institutions and asset managers, including engagement and 
monitoring of investee companies (corporate governance aspects) as well 
as their responsibilities towards the ultimate investors (whether pension 
fund beneficiaries, mutual fund investors, insurance beneficiaries or 
hedge fund investors), including avoiding conflicts of interests and 
reporting duties (investment management aspects). Coming into 
existence with the 2010 UK Code stewardship codes espoused investor-
led governance as a positive regulatory mechanism. For instance, one of 
the key objectives of the first two versions of the UK Code, which traces 
back to the 2010 Code on the Responsibilities of Institutional Investors of 
 
225 TAIWAN STOCK EXCHANGE, STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES FOR INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, 
available at http://cgc.twse.com.tw/static/stewardship_en.pdf. 
226 INVESTOR STEWARDSHIP GROUP, STEWARDSHIP FRAMEWORK FOR INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTORS (2017), available at https://isgframework.org/stewardship-principles/.  
227 International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN), ICGN Global Stewardship 
Principles (2016), available at 
https://www.icgn.org/sites/default/files/ICGNGlobalStewardshipPrinciples.pdf. 
228 EFAMA STEWARDSHIP CODE, PRINCIPLES FOR ASSET MANAGERS’ MONITORING OF, 
VOTING IN, ENGAGEMENT WITH INVESTEE COMPANIES, FIRST ADOPTED ON 06 APRIL 2011, 
REVISED IN 2017-2018, available at 
https://www.efama.org/Publications/Public/Corporate_Governance/EFAMA%20Stewar
dship%20Code.pdf. 
229 See, e.g., David William Roberts, Agreement in Principle: A Compromise for Activist 
Shareholders from the UK Stewardship Code, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 543 (2015). 
230 This is the case of the IGCN Code, supra note 227.  
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the since dissolved Institutional Shareholders’ Committee (ISC Code),231 
is to promote “the long term success of companies in such a way that the 
ultimate providers of capital also prosper”.232 Such an objective reflects 
the rationale whereby “shareholders” function “as monitors”.233 
Meanwhile, the (rebuttable) assumption is that such monitoring of 
corporate affairs by institutional investors should not only improve the 
governance and performance of investee companies, but should also assist 
in the efficient operation of the markets while strengthening the 
credibility of the market economy as a whole. But the objectives of 
stewardship codes are more perplexed. Shareholder stewardship (perhaps 
optimistically) conceptualizes investors as performing a two-fold function: 
a monitoring (corporate governance) function promoting long-term 
shareholder value and broader stakeholder welfare and an accountability 
function protecting the interests of the investors’ clients and ultimate 
investors (investment management) as well as the shareholders and 
stakeholders of their investee companies (corporate governance). Under 
the spell of this so-called investor paradigm,234 which dovetails with the 
theory of “universal owners”,235 the key tenets of the institutions’ 
investment management and corporate governance functions and how 
they relate to institutions’ long-term liabilities and long term corporate 
performance are regarded to be blessed by a broader public interest in the 
creation of social value, beyond the maximization of profits. Clearly, the 
(perhaps) magic(?) regulatory formula of stewardship is aimed at 
protecting the private interests of ultimate clients and beneficiaries, 
while at the same time promoting long-term corporate governance and 
sustainability coalescing shareholder with stakeholder interests and 
private with public interests.  
On a substantive level, this important institutional characteristic of 
stewardship codes is exemplified in their corresponding regard for public 
policy concerns which are extraneous to considerations of shareholder 
 
231 The ISC Code is available at 
https://www.theinvestmentassociation.org/assets/components/ima_filesecurity/secure.p
hp?f=industry-guidance/isc-01.pdf.  
232 UK Code 2012, supra note 206, at 1.   
233 It is noteworthy, however, that the current UK Code 2020 defines stewardship as “the 
responsible allocation and management of capital across the institutional investment 
community to create sustainable value for beneficiaries, the economy and society” and 
therefore prioritizes the investment management perspective of stewardship to the 
corporate governance one. See UK Code 2020, supra note 206, at 4.  
234 See, further, Katelouzou, Reflections on the Nature, supra note 200. 
235 For a criticism of the theory of universal owners, see Benjamin J. Richardson & 
Maziar Peihani, Universal Investors and Socially Responsible Finance: A Critique of a 
Premature Theory, 30 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 405 (2015). 
49 
 
welfare. Even though there are differences in terms of the specific content, 
authorship and nature across the various stewardship codes,236 they all 
reflect the view that engagement by institutional investors is an enforcer 
of good corporate governance, while they recognize that powers come with 
responsibilities at both the investment management and corporate 
governance levels, thereby, tapping into the major problem with 
increasing solicitude for shareholders, namely the rise of financialization 
and short-term shareholder value processes at the expense of other 
stakeholders.237 In addition, all the twenty-two national stewardship 
codes link the interests of ultimate investors with those of the 
stakeholders of the investee companies, despite variations in emphasis, 
substantive details and context.238 Further, the overwhelming majority 
(fourteen) clearly links stewardship to the creation of long-term 
sustainable value for the investee companies.239 Sixteen stewardship 
codes specifically refer to social, environmental and governance (ESG) 
considerations thereby re-bundling “socially responsible investment” 
(SRI)240 into shareholder stewardship.241 This trend of advocating long-
termism and ESG-aware investing through stewardship codes and 
 
236 On the different issuing bodies of national stewardship codes, see Jennifer G. Hill, 
Good Activist/Bad Activist: The Rise of International Stewardship Codes, 41 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 497, 506-13 (2018). 
237 See, further, Dionysia Katelouzou, Shareholder Stewardship: A Case of 
(Re)Embedding Institutional Investors and the Corporation?, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK 
OF CORPORATE LAW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY (Beate Sjafjell & 
Christopher M. Bruner eds., 2019). 
238 For instance, the Japanese Stewardship Code tends to emphasize more 
shareholders’ interests rather than the interests of the ultimate beneficiaries and 
wider stakeholders. On a detailed comparison between the UK and Japanese 
Stewardship Codes, see Gen Goto, The Logic and Limits of Stewardship Code: The 
Case of Japan, 15 BERKELEY BUS. L. REV. 365 (2019). 
239 These are: ASCI Code, supra note 213, at 5; Canadian Code, supra note 215, at 7; 
CRISA, supra note 223, at 4 and 7; Danish Code, supra note 207, p. 3; Dutch Code, 
supra note, at 1; FSC Code, supra note 213, at 3; Hong Kong Code, supra note 217,  at 
1; Italian Code, supra note 208, at 16; Japan’s  Code, supra note 216, at 3; Kenyan 
Code, supra note 219, at 3; Malaysian Code, supra note 221, Preface; Singapore Code, 
supra note 222, at 3; Korea Code, supra note 220,  at 3; Swiss Code, supra note 211, at 
4; Taiwan Code, supra note 225,  at 2; and UK Code, supra note 206,  at 1.  
240 Further on the meaning of SRI, see Eurosif, European SRI Study 2016, available at 
http://www.eurosif.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/SRI-study-2016-HR.pdf. 
241 These are:  AMEC Code, supra note …, at 12; Canadian Code, supra note 215, at 7; 
CRISA, supra note 223, at 4; Dutch Code, supra note…; at 7; FSC Code, supra note 
213, at 10; Hong Kong Code, supra note 217, at 3; Italian Code, supra note 208, at 16; 
Japan’s Code, supra note 216, at 2; Kenyan Code, supra note 219, at 2892; Malaysian 
Code, supra note 221, at 13; PRDA, supra note 218, at 1; SEBI, supra note 218, at 3; 
Singapore Code, supra note 222, at 6; Taiwan Code, supra not 225, at 8; Thai Code, 
supra note 224, at 37; and UK Code 2020, supra note 206, at 15.  
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principles is also supported by the ICGN Global Stewardship 
Principles,242 and the EFAMA Code,243 while the recently revised UK 
Code elevated social and environmental factors, including climate change, 
to central components of stewardship.244  
In a similar vein, the SRD II is very much premised on the 
acceptance that an active corporate governance role for institutions will 
be aligned with the interests of their beneficiaries and the wider 
stakeholders of their portfolio companies.245 Article 3g of the directive 
requires institutional investors and asset managers to develop an 
engagement policy with the aim to improve both the financial and non-
financial performance of their investee companies, including the 
reduction of social and environmental risks and compels institutional 
investors and asset managers to engage with stakeholders (in particular 
employees) in developing a balanced, long-term framework of corporate 
governance. The directive, therefore, reflects a broad-based public 
interest in making institutional shareholders accountable for broader 
concerns in respect of companies’ operations and to wider constituents in 
the exercise of their engagement powers. 246 Public disclosure imposed on 
institutional investors and asset managers247 also seems to indicate the 
imposition of accountability on institutions beyond the private contours 
of their investment management relationship with their beneficiaries.  
Overall, the development of stewardship codes and principles bring 
a “public” coloration into shareholder engagement, which is essentially a 
“private” matter and can be seen as an –effort, but arguably an optimistic 
one, to realign the relationship between ownership and control of public 
companies, which had become increasingly divorced in the post-war 
decades and re-embed corporate governance and investment 
management into society.248 For transnational corporate governance 
regulation the rise and expansion of stewardship codes reflects the 
significant change over the past ten years concerning the question of 
 
242 ICGN Code, supra note 227, Preamble, at 5 and Principle 6. 
243 EFAMA Code, supra note 228, at 5. 
244  UK Code 2020, supra note 206, Principles 4 and 7 and at 4 (stating that 
[e]nvironmental, particularly climate change, and social factors, in addition to 
governance, have become material issues for investors to consider when making 
investment decisions and undertaking stewardship”).   
245 See SRD II, supra note 17, Recitals 14 and 15.   
246 On the public interests of the SRD II, see Iris H-Y Chiu & Dionysia Katelouzou, 
From Shareholder Stewardship to Shareholder Duties: is the Time Ripe?, in: 
SHAREHOLDERS’ DUTIES 131 (Hanne S. Birkmose ed., 2017). 
247 See SRD II, supra note 17, Articles 3g, 3h and 3i.   
248  See, further, Katelouzou, Shareholder Stewardship, supra note 237.  
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output legitimacy: more than ever are questions asked today that focus 
on who is “affected” by institutional investors’ behavior and, by 
consequence, by the promotion or the absence of relevant stewardship 
codes.  
The expansion of the stewardship codes’ regulatory prerogatives and 
directions also reflects back on the transformation of its associated 
constituencies. It is important to note in this respect that with regard to 
corporate governance’s “input legitimacy”, numerous private and public 
actors have become direct intervenors in the design of the stewardship 
codes and investors’ sustainability compliance regimes. Increasingly, we 
witness a cross-fertilization and deterritorialized production of norms 
produced by various private and public actors and the implications of such 
norm-production for the nature and enforcement of these codes.249 For 
instance, as noted above, the UK Code evolved out of the 2010 Code of the 
now dissolved ISC, which was set up at the behest of the Bank of England 
in the 1970s as part of the Heath government’s attempts to improve the 
relationships between institutional investors and public companies.250 
The members of the ISC were the originally four major UK institutional 
investors’ associations, i.e. the National Association of Pension Funds and 
the associations (then separate) representing investment trusts, unit 
trusts and insurers.251 In 1991 the ISC published a statement  which sets 
out non-binding, best practices for institutional investors and agents in 
relation to their responsibilities in respect of their investee companies.252 
This statement was revised in 2002, 2005 and 2007 before being upgraded 
to its status as a Code in 2009 (revised in 2010) that applied to 
institutional investors on a comply-or-explain basis. The ISC’s principles 
was an attempt by the institutional investors to self-regulate themselves 
pushing back any government intervention in respect of institutional 
shareholder engagement, especially following the Myners Review’s 
recommendation in 2001 to impose a statutory duty on asset managers 
“to intervene in companies – by voting or otherwise – where there is a 
 
249 For an approach in that direction, see already Ruth Aguilera and Gregory Jackson, 
The Cross-National Diversity of Corporate Governance: Dimensions and Determinants, 
28 ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REV., 447-465 (2003). 
250 On the policy role of the ISC, see DAVIES A, THE CITY OF LONDON AND SOCIAL 
DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FINANCE IN BRITAIN, 1957-1979 (2017). 
251 The Association of Investment Trust Companies and the Association of Unit Trust 
Managers have now merged to the Investment Management Association (IMA), while 
the Association of British Insurers (then British Insurance Association) has merged its 
investment department with the IMA to create the Investment Association. 
252 ISC, “The Responsibilities of Institutional Shareholders in the UK (December 
1991)”; see also Mila R. Ivanova, Institutional investors as stewards of the corporation: 
Exploring the challenges to the monitoring hypothesis, 26 BUS. ETH. 175 (2017). 
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reasonable expectation that doing so might raise the value of the 
investment”.253 UK policymakers had long regarded institutional 
shareholder engagement as vital to the corporate governance of public 
companies, but had deliberately sought (especially since the 1990s) to 
induce institutional shareholders to develop their own self-regulatory 
responses to public concerns arising from the reluctance of institutional 
investors to take an active stance in relation to corporate 
underperformance. Notably, the Cadbury Report fully endorsed the ISC’s 
1991 statement and called on institutional investors to play a more active 
role in the corporate governance of UK public companies.254 The 
Combined Code and subsequent versions of the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (now 2018) invariably encouraged institutional 
investors to engage constructively with the board of directors and to use 
their ownership influence to pressurize companies towards compliance 
with the Code’s provisions,255 while the Myners Review and Higgs Review 
both endorsed the ISC’s principles.256  
The upgrade of the ISC’s principles to a soft Stewardship Code 
introduced by the FRC in 2010 is an example of “enforced self-
regulation”,257 otherwise referred to as “meta-regulation”,258 and is part 
of an emerging market-oriented governance landscape which is closely 
associated with the long tradition of corporate governance codes. The 
2010 (and 2012) UK Code, like the UK Corporate Governance Code, 
adopted the comply-or-explain approach, that is voluntary signatories to 
the Code should comply or else explain why they do not comply with the 
Code’s seven principles.259 In a significant break with the long tradition 
of comply-and-explain in the area of corporate governance regulation, the 
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2020 UK Code adopts the stricter apply-and-explain approach 
emphasizing on stewardship outcomes rather than policies. Both 
approaches, however, are investor-led based on what UK regulators 
envisage as a “market for stewardship”.260 Stewardship signatories are 
expected to provide good annual reporting on stewardship, while asset 
owners are expected to monitor the stewardship activities of their asset 
managers. This emerging “market for stewardship” in the UK is 
supported by the facilitating role of the FRC’s tiering exercise261 as well 
as the support provided by the Investor Forum262 and the Investment 
Association’s Public Register and Long-term Reporting Guidance.263 At 
the same time, social enforcement (reputation) mechanisms, such as 
public esteem or shaming carried out by investors themselves,264 the 
media265 and civil society groups, 266 are becoming a key device for 
promoting stewardship and sustainability, especially climate change. 
Correspondingly, the enforcement of stewardship becomes an example of 
“dynamic accountability” within what Sabel and Zeitlin call 
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“experimentalist governance”267 where public and private (market and 
social) actors work together to create regulatory arrangements and 
support enforcement. This accountability-through-peer-review has for all 
UK-authorized asset managers a more coercive effect as it is backed by 
the Financial Conduct Authority’s Code of Conduct Handbook.268 This 
element of coerciveness of the UK Code through the introduction of an 
associated disclosure obligation on asset managers authorized by the FCA 
is broadly equivalent in effect to the effect of the UK Listing Rules for 
public companies, albeit different in scope and detail.  
Similar to the UK Code, all the other national stewardship codes are 
voluntary, soft-law developments based on self-proclamation and market 
enforcement, but the degree of their softness largely depends on the 
issuing body. From the total twenty-two national stewardship codes, nine 
have been issued by regulators or quasi-regulators and they all adopt a 
variant of the comply-or-explain or apply-and-explain enforcement 
model.269 Yet, from these the UK, Dutch, Indian (SEBI) and Japanese 
Codes are supported in their function from an underpinning body of 
mandatory rules and/or institutions as there is an obligation on the part 
of domestic investors to comply-or-(apply-and)explain.270 From the rest 
eleven codes, which have been issued by various industry participants or 
investors themselves, six adopt the comply(apply)-or-explain principle,271 
while the rest are completely voluntary in nature.272  
At the supranational level, Article 3g of the SRD II also adopts the 
comply-or-explain approach. However, it has been elsewhere argued that 
the SRD II is not far short of imposing a duty to demonstrate engagement, 
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as there is a duty on the part of asset owners and asset managers to 
publicly disclose the implementation and achievement of such 
engagement under Articles 3h and 3i.273 Arguably the disclosure-based 
regulation compels that certain engagement conduct needs to be carried 
out in order for there to be sufficient matters to report and moves away 
from treating shareholder engagement as a voluntary practice, as is the 
case under national stewardship codes. The SRD II, in a “capital market 
regulation facet”,274 is therefore a step towards legalizing or juridifying 
shareholder engagement and stewardship as a response to the social 
appetite for increasing regulation post the GFC. Moreover, Article 14b 
enables – but not obliges – Member States to provide for public 
enforcement for violations of the SRD II transposed provisions into 
national law. While only Italy and the Netherlands have introduced such 
penalties for violations of engagement and disclosure duties, the directive 
does not operate in a normative vacuum since four Member States, 
Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, the UK, have their own domestic soft-
law stewardship codes. These different approaches in enforcing 
stewardship are reflective of the increasing poly-centricity of stewardship 
norms and raise important questions about the future symbiosis of soft 
and semi-hard law norms.275 Finally, in terms of “output legitimacy”, 
while it is questionable whether soft law can efficiently serve more 
paternalistic objectives, subjecting institutional investment management 
to standards and scrutiny is arguably a form of re-regulation, in order to 
ensure that the privatized and financialized form of social welfare 
provision may deliver public interest objectives in due course.  
Our analysis shows that the development of the law of shareholder 
stewardship over the last decade is a powerful example of the complex 
intricacies between shareholder primacy and broader stakeholder welfare 
as regulatory objectives, and between internalized, self-regulatory 
processes of market-invoking regulation and official law making at both 
domestic and supranational levels. The development of stewardship codes 
also confirms the inseparability of corporate governance regulation and 
investment management regulation (and wider law-making reform) when 
it comes to introducing standards of optimal institutional shareholders’ 
behavior. Shareholder stewardship can be also seen as an example of an 
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increase of the national “policy space” in a global economy.276 Following 
in the steps of the development of corporate governance codes, the rapid 
diffusion of stewardship principles through replication and adaptation is 
a powerful denotation of the way in which private ordering maintains an 
intricately challenging tension with the embedded, institutional 
frameworks for official law-making. While some convergence towards 
universally acceptable stewardship principles can arguably arise from the 
operation of institutional investors, the stewardship codes themselves are 
embedded in the complex emerging political economies of corporate 
governance. The development of stewardship in countries with various 
shareholder, legal, institutional, economic, and cultural environments 
suggests that stewardship codes may have taken on a different role – 
perhaps multiple different roles – than the original “investor paradigm” 
underpinning the UK Code. Indeed, a few examples suggest that this may 
be occurring in myriad ways, with important implications for norm 
creation and law-making processes yet to be explored. In South Africa, 
the Code for Responsible Investing appears to prioritize responsible 
investment and ESG factors over all other ownership responsibilities.277 
In Japan, the Code appears to be a policy tool aimed at fulfilling a political 
and economic goal of reorienting governance away from its traditional 
lifetime employee stakeholder form of corporate governance. In effect, it 
is geared towards a more shareholder focused form of governance to 
promote risk taking and to improve returns on capital, while distinctly 
lacking, it seems, the public interest orientation that we have identified 
in other codes.278 In Singapore, stewardship principles developed and 
promoted by a government supported entity, Stewardship Asia, have set 
the rules of the game for how institutional investors should engage with 
listed companies – yet many of the most important listed companies are 
themselves government controlled.279 In Europe, it is unlikely that the 
SRD II will facilitate a convergence movement towards a single, 
harmonized set of stewardship principles as it engages in open 
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competition with pre-existing domestic stewardship codes or principles.280 
At the same time, the ICGN Principles has still to play the role of an 
international benchmark for good stewardship similar to the global 
relevance of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance.  
At the end of this exemplary case study we find that the evolving 
law of shareholder stewardship can shine some light on the new forms of 
transnational embeddedness of regulatory innovation in locally defined 
governance structures on the one hand, and their integration in spatially 
unfolding rule-making processes, on the other. As regards the here 
relevant actors, norms and processes, we find a tension that has long been 
growing between private and state, domestic and international actors, 
between shareholder primacy and broader stakeholder welfare, and 
between market-invoking and official-law making processes. 
Correspondingly, the development of the law of shareholder stewardship 
is a powerful illustration of the promise of a new methodology of 
transnational corporate governance in offering the necessary tools and 
the required analytical framework for understanding corporate 
governance regulation in the 21st century. 
 
V. CONCLUSION: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE – THE STAKES 
OF NORM CREATION RECONSIDERED 
The development of stewardship codes and principles by private and 
public actors to define institutional investors’ and asset managers’ 
responsibilities is part of an emerging market-oriented governance 
landscape which has seen a significant rise of corporate governance codes 
and codes of conduct, a development which still begs important 
explanation of cause, agency and, certainly, legitimacy. To simply 
attribute the expansion of private corporate governance norm production 
to the retreat of the state or the mounting public pressure on the state 
and on corporations to embrace the idea of corporate (social, 
environmental) responsibility, fall short of fully capturing the regulatory 
dynamics that have been shaping this field. But their very nature – their 
blended private and public objectives, their oscillation between hard and 
soft law and between state intervention and market ordering – has begun 
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to fundamentally alter the already demarcated regulatory landscape of 
corporate governance and pose significant questions, not only for 
regulatory governance in the area of corporate regulation. Effectively, the 
here undertaken attempt to revisit, retell and reimagine the emerging 
political economies of corporate governance as a transnational regulatory 
problem has opened up perspectives on the bigger picture of which 
corporate governance is but a part.  
We used shareholder stewardship as to illustrate the expansion and, 
at the same time, the deepening of national and regional policy spaces in 
a global economy. It is here where we came up with unexpected results. 
The development of stewardship codes speaks to the emergence of legal 
regimes that can no longer adequately be explained with reference to the 
“state” or the “market”, and is an example of intricate, domestic and 
transnational, multi-level processes of norm generation involving 
different national, supranational and private actors, using non-
traditional processes through which norms are being generated, which do 
not wholly comply with categories of statute, rule or treaty. We also found, 
that, in times of perceived and increasingly critically scrutinized market 
failures, the generation of soft law in the form of not always non-binding 
norms is being outsourced, but not to the markets directly. Instead, the 
task of coming up with a suitable regulatory regime is uploaded and 
relegated to supranational actors. The SRD II is an example of pursuing 
the harmonization of an area of law which had for a long time been 
perceived as overly privatized and, normatively, market-focused. In the 
SRD II, the originally soft, investor-driven law of shareholder 
stewardship appears to coalesce into hard, regulatory law after arriving 
at a state of what the late sociologist Niklas Luhmann, referred to as 
“counterfactually stabilised behavioural expectations.”281 Given the 
continuously growing pressure of global securities markets and their 
attending rules on the normative architecture of corporate law, a key 
question we need to ask is whether we are indeed facing a re-bundling of 
soft law corporate governance norms into hard law capital markets law.  
A related question concerns the normative assessment of emerging 
transnational corporate governance regimes such as the stewardship one. 
The so-called and endlessly abused “public interest” might function as a 
reference point when calling private investment management of 
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financialized social wealth to account. But, more likely is the re-
characterization of any future stewardship legalization as a form of 
regulatory accountability framework which goes beyond the traditional, 
law-and-economics approach to the corporate governance role of 
institutional shareholders to a broader “regulatory ecology” serving both 
private and public interests.282 There is also the issue of the chosen 
enforcement mode. Unlike the tradition of market-invoking regulation in 
the area of corporate governance which is based very much on the premise 
of enabling, private and market-driven regulatory modes, the 
development of shareholder stewardship serves more paternalistic 
objectives of aligning institutional investors’ corporate governance role 
with long-term corporate wealth creation as a social good. But if this is 
the purported regulatory aim behind the development of shareholder 
stewardship, the adoption of soft, “comply or explain” or “apply and 
explain” enforcement approaches seems out of step. While market 
discipline has long served as the default enforcement mode in corporate 
governance regulation and has been extensively examined within the 
context of corporate governance codes, letting asset owners and other 
market participants as the only monitors of the veracity of both the 
signatory statements and the actual outcomes of stewardship is not only 
of questionable effectiveness but is also out of step with the stated, 
“public” regulatory objectives.283  
It is therefore necessary to ask, whether this infused paternalism 
and the gradual hardening of the shareholder stewardship norms in the 
SRD II is but a superficial change or whether, instead, we should welcome 
it as an opportunity to place the institutional investors and the 
corporation more broadly in a post-“Embedded Liberalism” context. From 
the perspective of transnational corporate governance, the development 
of stewardship codes shows how the tradition of “market-focused” 
corporate governance regulation can and should no longer rely account on 
the path-dependent trajectories of national, law-making processes. The 
emergence of a transnational corporate governance is characterized by an 
intricate combination of public and private agency, but also of a variety of 
regulatory, evolving instruments where “hard” law is not stable. In that 
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sense, domestic corporate governance reform must be seen as part of an 
emerging transnational legal pluralism, which is shaped by the 
continuing normative legacies as well as the institutional and processual 
path-dependencies of particular, local political economies. But, at the 
same time, the legal pluralism of transnational corporate governance 
reveals itself in the co-existence, the interpenetration and the interaction 
of different regulatory forms.  
Seen in this light, the case of shareholder stewardship is illustrative 
of how soft law recommendations can enter a regulatory realm which is 
occupied by both public and private norm-entrepreneurs. While the 
former includes “the state” which pursues corporate law reform, the latter 
encompasses a wide range of private actors such as banks, investments 
funds, and expert groups who are calling for new rules to govern 
investment conduct. But, it also includes other stakeholders such as 
unions and labor activists, as well as civil society groups uniting and 
campaigning under different flags and themes. From this perspective, 
shareholder stewardship denotes how soft law recommendations may 
grow into widely accepted norms of “good governance” and solidify the 
perceived public interest. Shareholder stewardship is not the only case 
where we can draw out the complex correlations between different actors, 
levels and spaces of norm creation or where we can trace the infusion of 
public, stakeholder objectives into shareholder welfare. The well-
examined examples of the development of corporate governance codes and 
corporate codes of conduct already show the “law’s poly-
contextualization”.284 As for the newly amplified public interest in 
transnational corporate governance regulation, this traceable trend can 
be, for example, found in post-GFC corporate governance regulations in 
the UK and elsewhere, where efforts are underway that aim at solidifying 
public policies such as wealth distribution, equality in the boardrooms 
and labor force, and various social goals including long-term enterprise 
sustainability, wider stakeholder welfare, the protection of the 
environment, or gender and racial equality in economic organizations. 
Such policies are concerned with the objectives and outcomes of corporate 
activity within the wider fabric of the economy and the society and go well 
beyond law-and-economics perceptions of the corporation and its 
perceived purpose, effectively feeding into the changing policies of 
transnational corporate governance regulation in globally integrated, yet 
locally distinct market and regulatory places. 
The analysis offered in this article should be seen as woven into the 
broader transformative trends in transnational law, global law and legal 
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pluralism. It seeks to cut through the distinct layers of comparative 
company law and institutional analysis to shed a new light on the far-
reaching reform processes in domestic corporate governance systems 
worldwide but also on the proliferation of fora where, through new (and, 
old) actors and in reliance on and through the development of new 
processes of participation, drafting, dissemination and implementation, 
new norms are being created. Transnational corporate governance is here 
rendered as a methodological laboratory to inquire into emerging forms 
of authority and legitimacy, scrutinizing competing claims of 
effectiveness and testing the “real world” impact that emerging 
regulatory forms have on a wider set of stakeholders and “affected” 
populations. These new actors are directly engaged in negotiating 
competing interests regarding the economic but also the larger, social 
function of the firm, as they all operate in intertwined local and global 
contexts.285 They make competing claims regarding participation and 
control, but also regarding accountability, long-term orientation and 
protection of a wide range of local and distant interests.286 It comes as no 
surprise, then, that the scope of corporate governance regulation – 
whether it is the state or particular market actors who are taking the lead 
– continues to expand significantly. Concerns around environmental, 
social and economic sustainability, risk and reputation, equality and 
minority protection have become part of the field’s “common lexicon”,287 
while technological advances have an impact not only on the way both 
boardrooms and shareholder operate288, but also with regard to artificial 
intelligence’s fundamental transformation of financial markets 
operation.289 In that vein, a critical project of transnational corporate 
governance prompts a reconceptualization of the “transnationally 
 
285 See, e.g., David Monciardini, The Coalition of the Unlikely’ Driving the EU 
Regulatory Process of Non-Financial Reporting SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY J. 76-89 (2016). 
286 Zumbansen, Rethinking the Nature, supra note 183. 
287 See, e.g., Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, Sustainability in Corporate Law, 
Working Paper, 20 August 2019, available at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3441375. 
288 See, e.g., Florian Möslein Robots in the boardroom: artificial intelligence and 
corporate law in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
(Woodford Barfield & Ugo Pagallo eds. 2018); Anne Lafarre & Christoph Can der Elst, 
Blockchain technology for Corporate Governance and Shareholder Activism European 
Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 390/2018, available 
at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3135209. 
289 World Economic Forum (in cooperation with Deloitte), The New Physics of Financial 
Services. Understanding how artificial intelligence is transforming the financial 




embedded” corporation and its key actors as a counter model to today’s 
financialized economic governance framework. 
